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ANTI-BASIS* 
ETHAN YALE** 
Anti-basis is the untaxed benefit enjoyed by a taxpayer when a 
liability or obligation is incurred. In the business context, the 
untaxed benefit is an increase in asset basis or a tax deduction. In 
the personal context, the untaxed benefit might take one of those 
forms, or it might be (nondeductible) personal consumption. A 
well-functioning income tax system must keep track of any such 
untaxed benefit. If the liability from which the benefit derived is 
avoided by the taxpayer, the prior untaxed benefit must be 
counted as income (or must reduce basis). If there was no prior 
untaxed benefit relating to a liability, exceptions are necessary to 
various rules requiring income recognition (or basis reduction) 
on discharge or shifting of liabilities. 
Present law requires taxpayers to account for anti-basis, but it 
does so ad hoc. Various sections tacitly incorporate anti-basis—
such as §§ 108(e)(2), 357(c)(3), and the partnership definition of 
“liabilities” in regulation §	1.752-1(a)(4), to take just a few of the 
many examples—but each section exists on an island. A few 
prior commentators have sensed that a common underlying 
concept ties these rules together. Prior to this Article, however, 
there has been no thorough investigation of this concept. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Determining the impact of nearly all transactions on a taxpayer’s 
taxable income requires keeping track of and examining the 
relationship among a relatively small number of fundamental 
concepts, including: gross income, deductions, amount realized, tax 
basis, realization, recognition, capital expenditures, and depreciation. 
The thesis of this Article is that there is another, largely 
unappreciated, fundamental concept that feeds into the 
determination of taxable income. I will refer to this concept as “anti-
basis.” 
A loan is at once an asset to the lender and a liability to the 
borrower. The lender’s tax basis in the loan is set at inception. It 
equals the lender’s cost of acquiring the borrower’s promise to 
repay—that is, the lender’s tax basis equals the loan proceeds 
disbursed to the borrower. The borrower’s anti-basis in the loan 
equals its untaxed receipt of cash. Later, when the borrower repays 
principal, the lender has no income. Instead, the principal repayment 
is set off against and reduces the lender’s tax basis in its asset. 
Likewise, the borrower has no deduction. Instead the principal 
repayment is set off against and reduces the borrower’s anti-basis in 
its liability. 
Thus, the amount paid by the borrower to discharge or settle a 
liability minus the borrower’s anti-basis in the liability equals the 
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deduction (or, if negative, income) resulting from the liability. The 
arithmetic relationship among (a) the amount paid to discharge or 
settle a liability, (b) the borrower’s anti-basis in the liability, and (c) 
the resulting deduction or income is parallel to the relationship 
among (a) the amount realized on the sale or other disposition of an 
asset, (b) the owner’s basis in the asset, and (c) the resulting gain or 
loss. To see the analogy it is useful to set out the relationship in 
tabular form. 
 
Table 1: The basis-anti-basis analogy
 Asset disposition (§ 1001(a))1 Liability discharge 
(a)  amount realized  amount paid 
(b) less basis less anti-basis 
(c) equals gain (loss) equals deduction (income) 
 
The simplest example of income relating to discharge of a 
liability with anti-basis is cancellation of debt (“COD”) income. 
When a borrower defaults or a lender forgives a loan, the resulting 
COD income equals the difference between whatever amount is paid 
(possibly zero) and the borrower’s anti-basis. In the converse case—
when the amount paid is more than anti-basis, and a deduction 
results—the terminology depends on the context. To take one 
example, if the liability is a bond, the excess over anti-basis paid by 
the borrower to repurchase the bond is called repurchase premium 
and is deductible.2 
My goal is to convince you that anti-basis presently exists and is 
among the fundamental concepts in income tax law. I concede that 
defining and explaining the parameters of this concept is not strictly 
necessary. This is obvious given that the United States has been 
collecting income tax for over a century without officially 
acknowledging the anti-basis concept. I argue that recognizing the 
existence of anti-basis is useful nevertheless, for three reasons. 
First, thinking through familiar problems using anti-basis reveals 
a connection among the many rules that depend on the concept. 
Comparing these rules shows that anti-basis is woven into the law in 
 
 1. I.R.C. §	1001(a)(2012). Unless otherwise noted, all references to sections are to 
the Internal Revenue Code, as amended. 
 2. Treas. Reg. §	1.163-7(c) (1994).  
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different ways in different domains. This invites the question whether 
various departures from the usual way of accounting for anti-basis 
represent good policy. I try to answer some of these questions. 
Second, defining anti-basis facilitates a more concise explanation 
of doctrine. In this vein, consider that we could remove the term “tax 
basis” from the lexicon of income taxation and substitute in its place 
some (unavoidably long) phrase like “generally, except as otherwise 
provided or unless the context otherwise requires, the taxpayer’s 
original cost for the property reduced by amounts properly 
chargeable to capital and increased by capital expenditures made with 
respect to the subject property.” The exceptions (mostly for 
nonrecognition transactions) would then have to be tacked on. The 
increase in turgidity that would result from this change would be 
profound. Clarifying the role of anti-basis in evaluating the tax 
consequences of transactions involving liabilities will help to clarify 
speaking—and, therefore, hopefully clarify thinking—about the tax 
treatment of liabilities, particularly when they are shifted from one 
taxpayer to another. 
Third, acknowledging the existence of anti-basis as a meaningful 
concept takes pressure off of the related question of how to define the 
term “liability” for tax purposes. (This third reason is an extension of 
and perhaps a subset of the second reason, mentioned in the prior 
paragraph, but it is sufficiently important that it deserves to be 
mentioned separately.) It is difficult to overstate the practical 
significance of how “liability” is defined. This has been the central 
focus of hundreds if not thousands of court cases and numerous 
important statutory and regulatory reforms.3 As detailed below, 
disputes about the precise meaning of “liability” are in most instances 
disputes about whether some “obligation” has anti-basis. 
(“Obligation” is a term tax lawyers use to define an umbrella category 
that encompasses “liabilities,” in the technical sense used in various 
code sections and regulations, as well as other debts or commitments 
that fall outside the agreed on or claimed definition of “liabilities.”) If 
the focus were placed on the question of whether a given obligation 
 
 3. See, e.g., Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, 92 Stat. 2763, 2854–55 (1978) 
(codified at I.R.C. §	365(a), (c) and amending §	357(c)); United States v. Woods, 134 S. Ct. 
557, 563–65 (2013); T.D. 9207, 2005-26 I.R.B. 1344–68, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-irbs
/irb05-26.pdf [https://perma.cc/PVN2-6KGH] (amending Treas. Reg. §	1.752-1(a)(4), the 
definition of “liability” for purposes of partnership taxation under Subchapter K); Warren 
Rojas, Son-of-BOSS Settlement Nets $3.2 Billion for IRS, 106 TAX NOTES 1493, 1493 
(2005) (reporting the IRS settlement initiative of cases centering on definition of liability 
nets $3.2 billion). 
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has or lacks anti-basis, rather than on whether a particular obligation 
is a liability, conceptual mistakes would be avoided.4 
I. BACKGROUND 
I do not claim originality for the anti-basis idea. Though I know 
of no sustained discussion of anti-basis (or of the same concept by a 
different name) in tax policy literature, there have been a few 
references to the concept in prior scholarship. The earliest reference 
appears to be in the second edition of William Andrews’s casebook, 
Federal Income Taxation of Corporate Transactions.5 He floated the 
idea in the notes following Focht v. Commissioner.6 In Focht, a cash-
method shareholder transferred accounts payable to a controlled 
corporation in a transaction qualifying for nonrecognition under 
§	351.7 The question was whether the payables constituted “liabilities” 
under §	357(c).8 This question was crucial: the value of the payables 
outstripped the shareholder’s basis in the contributed assets, so if the 
payables were liabilities, gain would result. The Tax Court 
disregarded the plain language of the statute and found that the 
payables were not liabilities.9 
Andrews followed his analysis of the case with a question: 
“Would it help in Focht if there were some concept akin to basis for 
liabilities?”10 He answered the question by sketching out the useful 
role such a concept would serve in accounting for transactions that 
involve liability shifts and discharges.11 He also presaged doctrinal 
developments relating to the concept, including the addition of 
 
 4. Perhaps the most well-known conceptual mistake of this type was made by the 
Tax Court in Helmer v. Comm’r, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 727 (1975) (holding that a short option 
was not a “liability” for purposes of §	752). The holding in this case was the linchpin of the 
infamous Son-of-BOSS tax shelter. See I.R.S. Notice 2000-44, 2000-36 I.R.B. 255, 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-00-44.pdf	[http://perma.cc/NB6V-ALML]. According to 
IRS figures, over 1,800 taxpayers participated in Son-of-BOSS, and approximately $3.5 
billion was collected in an IRS initiative to settle these cases. See I.R.S. News Release IR-
2005-37 (Mar. 24, 2005), https://www.irs.gov/uac/IRS-Collects-$3.2-Billion-from-Son-of-
Boss%3B-Final-Figure-Should-Top-$3.5-Billion [https://perma.cc/ZM92-TG2D].  
 5. WILLIAM D. ANDREWS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATE 
TRANSACTIONS 183 (A. James Casner et al. eds., 2d ed. 1995). 
 6. Id. 
 7. Focht v. Comm’r, 68 T.C. 223, 224–25 (1977).  
 8. Id. at 224. The case arose before the 1978 amendment that added §	357(c)(3). Pub. 
L. No. 95-600, §	365, 92 Stat. 2763, 2854–55. 
 9. Focht, 68 T.C. at 227–29. 
 10. ANDREWS, supra note 5, at 183. 
 11. Id. 
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§§	108(e)(2) and 357(c)(3), both of which are discussed at length 
below.12 
Three years later, in 1982, Wayne Barnett filed his well-known 
amicus brief in Commissioner v. Tufts,13 which included reference to 
the concept (with proper credit given to Andrews).14 Barnett argued 
that just as taxpayers must keep track of prior expenditures relating 
to an asset, so too must they keep track of “unaccounted-for prior 
receipts with respect to a liability.”15 Barnett explained that on the 
asset side the concept has a name—basis—which has statutory 
imprimatur, so the need for the account is familiar and the conceptual 
framework for determining and adjusting basis is well understood.16 
Barnett argued that the cognate concept with respect to liabilities was 
no less necessary to a well-functioning system but the necessity was 
obscured by lack of a name.17 
Exaggerating somewhat, Barnett claimed, “Andrews has 
suggested that it can similarly be referred to simply as the taxpayer’s 
‘basis’ for the liability.”18 As I read Andrews, he was not suggesting 
that the term “basis” be assigned double duty (for both assets and 
liabilities); rather, Andrews posited that the law would be improved if 
everyone recognized the existence of “some [unnamed] concept akin 
to basis for liabilities.”19 I have chosen “anti-basis” rather than 
perpetuating Barnett’s suggested convention of referring to the 
liability accounting concept as “basis” for the simple reason that the 
name “basis” is already taken. Asking “basis” to do double duty for 
 
 12. See infra Sections III.B.1, III.B.3. Andrews also discussed the concept in his 
article, On Beyond Tufts. He explained that the face amount of the debt in Crane and 
Tufts 
is exactly like basis except for its sign; it is a mirror image of asset basis. Just as 
asset basis represents something spent but not yet deducted, the debt in Crane and 
Tufts represents something received but not yet reflected in income. As such, it is 
an element of the taxpayer’s tax history that needs to be taken into account	.	.	.	. 
William D. Andrews, On Beyond Tufts, 61 TAXES 949, 954 (1983). 
 13. 461 U.S. 300 (1982). 
 14. Brief for Wayne G. Barnett as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 8, 
Comm’r v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300 (1983) (No. 81-1536) [hereinafter Barnett Brief]. This 
amicus brief is well-known to tax lawyers and law students because it formed the basis for 
the concurring opinion of Justice O’Connor in Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 317 (O’Connor, J., 
concurring), which is reproduced in most basic federal income tax casebooks. 
 15. Barnett Brief, supra note 14, at *4. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. ANDREWS, supra note 5, at 183. 
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historical accounting with respect to assets and liabilities would be 
more confusing than using a different term. 
There are a few other scattered references to the concept. The 
most interesting of these, and the only one to use the term “anti-
basis” in print, is a 2008 article in Tax Notes.20 Calvin Johnson argued 
in favor of closing what he referred to as “deferred revenue accounts” 
by adding a new code section to mandate this result.21 Johnson 
explained that the credit balance of a liability or deferred revenue 
account can be referred to as “antibasis.”22 He gives credit for the 
term to Wayne Barnett, acknowledging that, although Barnett did not 
use the term “antibasis” in his Tufts amicus brief, the logic of the 
concept is sketched out in the brief, and Barnett used the term 
“antibasis” when teaching “a generation of his students at Stanford 
Law School”23 (including Johnson). There is some minor overlap 
between Johnson’s article and this one, but the thesis of Johnson’s 
article is that a statutory clarification would be desirable (to shut 
down a certain class of abusive tax shelters, in particular transactions 
in which taxpayers seek to avoid including deferred income),24 
whereas my goal is to explore anti-basis more fundamentally and 
systematically.25 
Some readers will wonder how anti-basis relates to negative 
basis, sometimes referred to as subzero basis. Adjusted basis is the tax 
accounting of a property owner’s after-tax net investment in some 
unit of property.26 If investment exceeds disinvestment then basis is 
positive. When things are flipped around, basis could—in concept—
go below zero. Under present law, however, when basis hits zero, 
disinvestment is suspended or gain is triggered. For example, 
depreciation deductions (tracking disinvestment) stop when basis hits 
 
 20. Calvin H. Johnson, Closing Deferred Revenue, 121 TAX NOTES 965, 967 (2008). 
 21. Id.  
 22. Id. at 967. 
 23. Id. at 967 n.9. 
 24. Id. at 969. 
 25. At least two practice treatises come close to recognizing anti-basis. Both treatises 
recognize interrelationships among disparate doctrinal rules and that “similar principles” 
run through these rules, but neither explores these principles in any systematic way. See 1 
BORIS I. BITTKER, MARTIN J. MCMAHON, JR. & LAWRENCE A. ZELENAK, FEDERAL 
INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS ¶	4.05[3][f] (3d ed. 2003) (noting the conceptual link 
between §§	108(e)(2) and 357(c)(3)); see also WILLIAM S. MCKEE, WILLIAM F. NELSON & 
ROBERT L. WHITMORE, FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERS ¶¶ 
7.01–.05 (4th ed. 2007) (recognizing the connection between the partnership definition of 
“liability” and cognate issues under Subchapter C, including situations implicating 
§§	357(c)(3) and 358(h)). 
 26. 2 BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, 
ESTATES, & GIFTS	¶ 41.1 (3d ed. 2000) [hereinafter TAXATION OF INCOME vol. 2]. 
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zero; in a transfer of encumbered assets to a controlled corporation in 
a nonrecognition transaction under §	351, when the liabilities shifted 
to the corporation are greater than the shareholder’s basis in the 
contributed assets, §	357(c) requires the shareholder to report gain. 
The gain reported under §	357(c) tops up the owner’s after-tax 
investment in the property just enough to avoid negative basis. It 
doesn’t have to be this way. Negative basis is an idea with a 
respectable conceptual foundation and academic pedigree, but, again, 
it has been ruled out doctrinally, except in very limited 
circumstances.27 
Viewed in this way, negative basis is just the natural extension of 
tax basis beyond the (artificial) zero bound, not a conceptually 
distinct idea. Anti-basis, in contrast, is an entirely distinct idea. 
Indeed, as I describe in the next Part, anti-basis is the polar opposite 
of basis. 
II. GENERAL DEFINITION AND TEST 
Anti-basis is a largely unacknowledged tax accounting concept. 
Anti-basis measures and tracks the untaxed benefit that a taxpayer 
enjoys as a concomitant of an increase in the liabilities (or 
obligations) to which the taxpayer is subject. Anti-basis is the polar 
opposite of tax basis: tax basis measures costs, anti-basis measures 
benefits; tax basis is always associated with an asset, anti-basis is 
always associated with a liability. 
To test whether there is anti-basis associated with a particular 
liability, ask whether payment of the liability would be nondeductible 
and noncapital (that is, not capitalized into basis). If the answer is that 
paying the liability is both nondeductible and noncapital, the liability 
has anti-basis. If, on the other hand, paying the liability either 
generates a deduction or increases tax basis, the liability lacks anti-
basis. 
The reason this test works is that it sorts cases into two types: (a) 
cases where the taxpayer has already enjoyed a benefit related to the 
liability (yes anti-basis); and (b) cases where the benefit has not yet 
accrued (no anti-basis). In the business context, the benefit will be a 
tax attribute, either a deduction or an increase in tax basis. In the 
personal context, the benefit will be either an increase in tax basis or 
 
 27. See generally George Cooper, Comment, Negative Basis, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1352 
(1962) (“exploring many of the major negative basis problems”). One area where negative 
basis exists in present law is the consolidated return regulations. See Treas. Reg. §	1.1502-
19(a)(2)(ii) (2015). 
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consumption. In both contexts, when a benefit has already accrued 
but the liability that generated the benefit has not yet been 
discharged, it is necessary to keep track of the benefit that was 
enjoyed prior to payment of the liability so that the benefit can be 
reversed if the liability is discharged or somehow sidestepped without 
payment. When the benefit associated with a liability has not yet been 
taken into account, however, there is nothing to reverse if the liability 
is discharged or shifted without payment, and hence there is no anti-
basis. 
As I mentioned in Part I, the paradigmatic example of a liability 
with anti-basis is a bank loan. The borrower is subscribing to an asset-
liability package comprised of loan proceeds and a commitment to 
repay principal in the future. The loan proceeds have basis equal to 
the amount borrowed, and the commitment to repay—the liability—
has anti-basis in the same amount. Confirm this by applying the 
suggested test: Would payment of the liability give rise to a 
deduction? Here the answer is no; ergo the liability has anti-basis. 
A basic counterexample involves a liability for some amount that 
the taxpayer is bound to pay as a matter of law but which has not yet 
ripened into a deduction. For instance, suppose the taxpayer, a 
shopkeeper, is the defendant in a slip-and-fall tort suit brought by a 
customer injured in the taxpayer’s shop. The claim against the 
shopkeeper has been resolved—meaning the legal liability has been 
established for a known amount—but the claim has not been paid. 
The claim is not yet deductible, but it will be when it is paid.28 
Because the claim is deductible, there is no anti-basis. 
Sometimes a claim begins without anti-basis and then acquires 
anti-basis as time goes by. Consider our shopkeeper’s liability related 
to purchasing inventory. The shopkeeper’s ability to claim a 
deduction must wait until “economic performance” occurs, which is 
generally when the inventory is delivered.29 Thus, if we suppose, for 
example, that the shopkeeper agreed to purchase some minimum 
quantity of inventory over a certain term from one of its suppliers, the 
shopkeeper’s obligation to live up to the terms of the contract (a 
“liability” in my usage) came into existence at the inception of the 
contract, but lacked anti-basis at inception. Later, when the supplier 
 
 28. No deduction is permitted yet without regard to the shopkeeper’s method of 
accounting. If the shopkeeper is on the cash method, the deduction is deferred until 
payment. If the taxpayer is on the accrual method, the deduction is deferred until 
economic performance occurs. In this case, economic performance occurs when payment 
is made. See I.R.C. §	461(h)(2)(C)(ii). 
 29. See §	461(h)(2)(A)(ii). 
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delivered inventory to the taxpayer and economic performance 
occurred, the liability acquired anti-basis in an amount equal to the 
accrued deduction. 
The test for and definition of anti-basis sometimes (at least 
apparently) contradict each other. This occurs, for instance, when the 
taxpayer never received a benefit with respect to a given liability, yet 
would be denied a deduction (or other favorable tax attribute) if the 
liability were paid. In cases of this type, the test suggests the existence 
of anti-basis, the definition suggests the opposite. 
Consider a fine for breaking the law. Say our shopkeeper’s sign 
was larger than the local zoning law permits. If the shopkeeper pays a 
fine, no deduction is allowed.30 If having a larger sign earned the shop 
more income, the incremental income would be taxed; hence there 
would be no “untaxed benefit,” which, under the definition, is 
necessary to the existence of anti-basis. Yet payment of the fine 
would not give rise to a deduction owing to the statutory rule 
precluding deductions for fines and penalties.31 Thus the test implies 
that there is anti-basis. 
In cases of this sort, the contradiction between definition and test 
is evidence of tension between fundamental theoretical concepts, such 
as the meaning of income under the Haig-Simons conception, or some 
other ideal,32 and present-law rules such as §	162(f).33 Results of the 
definition and test diverge because theory and doctrine diverge. How 
one mediates conflicts of this sort depends on the goal of the analysis 
at hand. If the goal is accurately to account for theoretical concepts 
then the test can be rewritten so it is in harmony with the definition.34 
Alternatively, if the goal is to conform the definition of anti-basis 
to existing law, then the conflict between the general definition and 
 
 30. §	162(f). 
 31. Id. 
 32. 1 BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, 
ESTATES, & GIFTS	¶	3.1.1 (3d ed. 1999) [hereinafter TAXATION OF INCOME vol. 1] 
(“Among contemporary American economists,	the so-called Haig-Simons definition of 
‘income’ is the most widely accepted: ‘Personal income may be defined as the algebraic 
sum of (1) the market value of rights exercised in consumption and (2) the change in the 
value of the store of property rights between the beginning and end of the period in 
question,” (quoting HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 50 (1938))). 
 33. I.R.C. §	162(f) (precluding deduction for fines and penalties). 
 34. To mesh with Haig-Simons, the test would take the following form: would the 
liability in question give rise to a deduction (or be capitalized into basis) under a set of 
rules designed to implement a system conforming to the Haig-Simons ideal? If yes, then 
no anti-basis, and conversely. 
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the test will persist and the test must be given precedence.35 Little 
damage is done to the usefulness of anti-basis by the existence of 
cases of this type; indeed, anti-basis is useful precisely because it helps 
to identify instances where the present-law rules and general concepts 
are pulling in opposite directions, which has been a fixture of tax-
policy scholarship for decades.36 
The problem of mediating theoretical purity and fidelity to 
present-law rules arises for other fundamental concepts in tax, not 
just anti-basis. Take a taxpayer who purchases IBM stock for $100 
and sells in one year for $110. During the year, inflation was 4%. How 
much income does the taxpayer have? The answer is the excess of 
$110 over the taxpayer’s basis in her IBM stock, which is either $100 
(under present law)37 or $104 (if tax basis were indexed for inflation). 
Everyone who has considered the question agrees that if the capital 
gains tax were indexed for inflation, the change would be 
implemented through an adjustment to tax basis.38 Everyone agrees, 
moreover, that the failure to index basis under present law results in 
systematic mismeasurement of real income.39 Whether one formulates 
the definition of basis as under present law (basis equals historical 
cost simpliciter) or with indexing (basis equals historical cost adjusted 
periodically for inflation) depends on the objective. The existence of 
more than one plausible objective does not undermine the existence 
or usefulness of the concept of tax basis, even though the concept 
takes different forms in service of different objectives. So it is with 
anti-basis. 
 
 35. If the goal is to conform to present law, it is conceivable (but not realistic) that the 
general definition could be modified so that it would in all cases match the output of the 
test. The difficulty with this approach is that the test is, by its nature, both concise and 
sensitive to the innumerable special rules under present law. In contrast, the special rules 
under present law would have to be written into the definition one-by-one. The definition 
would quickly become so unwieldy that it would be useless in explaining or understanding 
the basic underlying concept. 
Articulating the concept in terms of the test, without an accompanying definition, is 
the approach taken by the partnership tax rules implemented in 2005, as discussed below. 
See infra Section IV.E. 
 36. See, e.g., STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM 175–76 (1973) 
(discussing the difficulties in tax-policy reform).  
 37. I.R.C. §	1012. 
 38. See, e.g., VITO TANZI, INFLATION AND THE PERSONAL INCOME TAX: AN 
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 27–28 (1980); Reed Shuldiner, Indexing the Tax Code, 48 
TAX L. REV. 537, 548 (1993); Emil M. Sunley, Indexing the Income Tax for Inflation, 32 
NAT’L TAX J. 328, 328 (1979). 
 39. See sources cited supra note 38. 
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III. BASIC EXAMPLES 
Liabilities can be categorized according to whether the claim is 
fixed or contingent and, further, whether payment would give rise to a 
deduction (or be capitalized into basis)40 when paid or accrued. To 
demonstrate the existence and usefulness of anti-basis I will consider 
four basic liability types: (A) fixed, nondeductible; (B) fixed, 
deductible; (C) contingent; and (D) noncapital, nondeductible. For 
each category, I will explain the conventional doctrine regarding the 
treatment of the obligor and then explain how the doctrine can be 
reformulated—or, in some instances, should be revised—to reflect the 
presence or absence of anti-basis. 
A. Fixed, Nondeductible Liabilities 
1. Discharged by Payment 
Under the conventional understanding, loan proceeds are not 
taxable income when received by the borrower on the theory that the 
borrower is no richer. The borrower’s obligation to repay the loan 
decreases the borrower’s wealth by an amount that offsets the wealth 
increase from the loan proceeds. It follows that repayment is 
nondeductible. Repayment is costly to the borrower from a cash flow 
standpoint, but repayment extinguishes the obligation to repay and, 
hence, is not costly, all things considered.41 
The tax consequences of this transaction can be explained using 
anti-basis. The borrower’s receipt of the loan proceeds—cash receipt 
without income—generated anti-basis. When the loan is repaid, the 
repayment is set off against and extinguishes the borrower’s anti-basis 
in the liability. No deduction is permitted; if one were allowed, the tax 
benefit of the deduction would duplicate the benefit of excluding the 
loan proceeds from income at the inception of the loan. 
Just as tax basis is always associated with some asset owned by 
the taxpayer, so too is anti-basis always associated with some liability 
for which the taxpayer is responsible.42 Thus, extinguishing a liability 
 
 40. An expense is deductible in the sense that the expense either gives rise to a 
deduction presently or is capitalized into basis that can be recovered at some later time; 
likewise, “nondeductible” refers to costs that generate neither deductions nor basis. 
Current deductions and capital expenditures will be explicitly distinguished when the 
context requires. 
 41. TAXATION OF INCOME vol. 1, supra note 32, ¶	6.1; William D. Popkin, The 
Taxation of Borrowing, 56 IND. L.J. 43, 43 (1980). 
 42. The liability might be an encumbrance on the taxpayer’s property but not be a 
liability of the taxpayer personally, as is true for nonrecourse debt. The tax treatment of 
nonrecourse debt is examined below. See infra Section IV.C. 
94 N.C. L. REV. 485 (2016) 
2015] ANTI-BASIS 497 
necessarily implies that anti-basis associated with the liability, if it 
exists, will be extinguished too. 
2. Cancelled by the Creditor 
Under the conventional understanding, if the lender cancels 
some or all of the debt—for example by accepting partial or no 
repayment in satisfaction of the borrower’s original commitment—the 
borrower will have COD income equal to the excess of the original 
amount lent over the amount repaid, if any. The prevailing theory 
explaining this outcome is related to the treatment of the borrower 
when the loan proceeds were transferred to the borrower. The 
borrower didn’t have income because of the expectation that the 
borrower would live up to her obligation to repay the loan. When the 
borrower defaults, it is necessary to correct the tax accounting for the 
loan transaction because the future did not unfold as expected.43 
Again, the result can be explained using anti-basis. As noted 
above, because the liability is being extinguished, any associated anti-
basis must also be extinguished. The anti-basis is extinguished by 
payment to the extent thereof, and the balance is converted into 
COD income. To state things more directly, the borrower’s COD 
income equals the excess of anti-basis over the amount repaid to the 
lender, if any.44 
3. Transferred in Asset Sale 
Under the conventional understanding, if an asset (Blackacre) 
secures a loan and the asset is sold to a buyer who takes ownership 
subject to the lender’s claim, the seller (the original borrower) 
includes the amount of the loan in her amount realized.45 The buyer 
gets tax basis for the price paid, including the portion of the purchase 
price paid in the form of debt assumption.46 
 
 43. See TAXATION OF INCOME vol. 1, supra note 32, ¶¶ 7.1–7.7 (discussing income 
from a discharge of indebtedness); Boris I. Bittker & Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Income 
From the Discharge of Indebtedness: The Progeny of United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 
66 CALIF. L. REV. 1159, 1165 (1978). The theory explaining COD income identified in the 
text is referred to as the “prevailing theory” because there is another theory that has some 
judicial support, but is widely regarded as defective: the “freeing of assets” theory, which 
can be traced back to Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Empire Co., 271 U.S. 170, 174–75 (1926). The 
(dubious) continuing vitality of the freeing of assets theory is discussed in Taxation of 
Income vol. 1, supra note 32, ¶	7.1. 
 44. See supra Table 1. 
 45. Crane v. Comm’r, 331 U.S. 1, 6–14 (1947). 
 46. I.R.C. §	1012. 
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The buyer does not get a deduction if she repays the loan as 
expected.47 The buyer has already been given basis in Blackacre on 
account of the loan. To give the buyer a deduction for paying this 
same liability would be double counting. The buyer should, however, 
be permitted to deduct interest paid on the loan. 
A useful way to think about these rules—useful analytically and 
also because it has been endorsed by the Supreme Court—is to 
imagine an alternative transaction in which the buyer purchases 
Blackacre purely for cash (no debt assumption), and the parties find 
themselves in identical commercial positions immediately following 
the sale. These results would follow if (a) the buyer took out a new 
loan from the original lender in the amount of the outstanding loan to 
the original borrower-seller, (b) the buyer transfers to the seller the 
proceeds of this loan plus the cash that was paid in the original 
transaction, and (c) the seller uses a portion of the sales proceeds to 
repay her loan.48 
In net effect, the buyer, seller, and lender all wind up in the same 
positions after this more arduous, three-step transaction. In other 
words, the two transactions being compared are commercial 
substitutes. To avoid giving preference to form over substance, and 
the resulting inefficient tax planning, it is desirable that the 
transactions be taxed the same. So they are under present law. 
An unstated assumption in the example to this point is that the 
interest rate is a market rate at the time of the sale (so there is no 
bond premium or market discount). If this assumption is false, 
everything is much more complicated conceptually. Present law 
largely ignores the important issues raised by premium and discount 
liabilities. I discuss these issues below.49 
Explained using anti-basis, the seller’s amount realized equals 
both the sales proceeds received from the buyer and the seller’s anti-
basis in the liability shifted to the buyer. The buyer’s cost basis in 
Blackacre equals the cash paid plus the face amount of the liability 
shifted from seller to buyer. Because the shifted liability generates 
asset basis for the buyer, the liability has anti-basis in the buyer’s 
 
 47. Macgruder v. Supplee, 316 U.S. 394, 398 (1942) (“Payment by a subsequent 
purchaser is not the discharge of a burden which the law has placed on him, but is actually 
as well as theoretically a payment of purchase price	.	.	.	.	”). 
 48. Comm’r v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 312 (1983) (“From the [seller’s] point of view, 
when his obligation is assumed by a third party who purchases the encumbered property, 
it is as if the [seller] first had been paid with cash borrowed by the [buyer] from the 
mortgagee on a nonrecourse basis, and then had used the cash to satisfy his [own] 
obligation to the mortgagee.”). 
 49. See infra Section IV.B. 
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hands. The buyer gets no deduction on payment of the principal 
amount of the liability (which, if allowed, would be a windfall 
considering the liability shift generated asset basis). The buyer does, 
however, get a deduction for interest paid on the liability. 
4. Transferred to Controlled Corporation 
Continue the example with a loan that encumbers Blackacre. 
Assume, however, that rather than selling Blackacre in an arm’s 
length transaction, the owner contributes Blackacre to a corporation 
she controls in a transaction qualifying for nonrecognition under 
§	351. The shareholder does not have to treat the liability shift to the 
corporation as cash received, contrary to the usual rule applicable to 
taxable sales.50 As illustrated above, in a taxable asset sale the 
principal amount of the loan shifted to the buyer forms a part of the 
seller’s amount realized, akin to the receipt of cash.51 Departing from 
this logic for transfers to controlled corporations is justified by the 
idea that triggering boot gain on contributions of encumbered 
property would frustrate the goal of removing tax impediments to 
corporations.52 But the departure necessitates a basis reduction in the 
shareholder’s shares by the amount of the liability assumed.53 
Otherwise the shareholder would enjoy a windfall. 
To make this concrete, assume Blackacre, worth $10, is security 
for a bank loan worth $3. The contributing shareholder’s basis in 
Blackacre prior to the contribution is $4. Blackacre is contributed in 
exchange for stock worth $7 (Blackacre’s net value considering the 
bank loan). The shareholder takes a basis in her shares of $1, equal to 
her basis in Blackacre less the liabilities shifted to the corporation. 
Compare the taxpayer’s positions before and after the contribution: 
  
 
 50. §	357(a) (reversing the rule in United States v. Hendler, 303 U.S. 564, 565 (1938)); 
see Stanley S. Surrey, Assumption of Indebtedness in Tax-Free Exchanges, 50 YALE L.J. 1, 
14–15 (1940). 
 51. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
 52. 1 BORIS BITTKER & JAMES EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF 
CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS ¶	3.06[1] (7th ed. 2014). 
 53. §	358(a)(1)(A)(ii), (d)(1). 
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Table 2: Transfer to Controlled Corporation
   Fixed, nondeductible liability 
Taxpayer’s position before the 
contribution: direct ownership 
of Blackacre 
Taxpayer’s position after the 
contribution: indirect ownership 
of Blackacre 
Blackacre value 10 Stock value 7 
Basis 4 Stock basis  1 (4 – 3) 
Bank loan 3 Bank loan 0 
Net value 7 (10 – 3) Net value  7 
Unrealized gain 6 (10 – 4) Unrealized gain 6 (7 – 1) 
 
As this example illustrates, the value of the stock the shareholder 
receives is the net value she transfers to the corporation. If the 
shareholder took a basis in her stock equal to her basis in Blackacre 
($4), her unrealized gain would shrink by $3, the value of the liability 
transferred (unrealized gain would drop from $6 to $3). This would be 
a coherent result if the $3 liability shift were treated as boot and 
triggered tax on $3 of the shareholder’s precontribution gain. As 
explained above, however, liability assumptions are generally not 
treated as boot in transfers to controlled corporations.54 
Suppose, alternatively, that the principal balance on the bank 
loan shifted to the corporation were $5, rather than $3. In this case 
the rules just illustrated break down. Under these rules the liability 
shift is not considered boot and the shareholder’s basis in her stock is 
her basis in the contributed property reduced by shifted liabilities. 
Thus, she would end up with a basis of negative $1 ($4 less $5). At 
least in this context, there is nothing wrong in theory with assigning a 
negative basis to the shareholder’s shares, but the rules are designed 
to prevent this.55 In particular, there is an exception to the rule that 
liability shifts are not boot; when shifted liabilities exceed the basis of 
transferred assets, the excess is treated as boot.56 In this case, the 
liability shift would result in a basis reduction of $3 (from $3 to $0, a 
reduction in basis “to the extent thereof”) and boot gain for the 
remainder of $1. 
 
 54. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
 55. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
 56. See §	357(c). 
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Here, for the first time, restating present doctrine using anti-basis 
simplifies things dramatically. The shareholder’s basis in her shares is 
her basis in the asset transferred reduced by her anti-basis in the 
liabilities shifted, leaving her with a basis in her stock equal to her 
precontribution gain in the transferred property. In the first example 
sketched out above, the shareholder’s asset basis was $4 and her anti-
basis in shifted liabilities was $3, so her stock basis is $4 – $3 = $1. In 
the alternative, anti-basis in shifted liabilities ($5) outstrips stock basis 
($4) in transferred assets, and the shareholder has gain equal to the $1 
difference. The use of anti-basis simply and elegantly accounts for the 
boot gain that is, under current law, the result of an ad hoc exception 
to a general rule. 
B. Fixed, Deductible Liabilities 
To illustrate the treatment of fixed, deductible liabilities under 
present law and using anti-basis, suppose that, rather than a bank 
loan, the liability is a tort liability of the owner of Blackacre. 
Blackacre is rented out for use as a playground. A child was injured 
when she fell and landed on a large rock that the owner should have 
removed. Although the liability is fixed and determinable,57 it is not 
yet deductible because it has not yet been paid.58 
If and when the liability is paid, the tax consequence is a 
deduction. This is so straightforward that thinking about the 
transaction using anti-basis is counterproductive. Thinking about the 
transaction as a liability realization, however, confirms that anti-basis 
logic is compatible with basic doctrine.59 Things are considerably 
more interesting, however, if the liability is cancelled by the creditor 
or transferred to another taxpayer, such as an arm’s length buyer or 
controlled corporation. 
 
 57. Those versed in tax accounting will recognize this as the test for deductibility by 
an accrual method taxpayer, taken to mean that the legal obligation is fixed and the 
amount can be determined with reasonable accuracy. See §	461(h)(4). In 1984 this test was 
codified and embellished so that in addition to meeting the fixed and determinable 
standard, economic performance must also occur before a deduction may be accrued. 
§	461(h)(1). 
 58. If the taxpayer is an accrual method taxpayer, the deduction must await payment 
because payment constitutes economic performance. See §	461(h)(2)(C) and sources cited 
supra note 57. If the taxpayer is on the cash method of accounting, then deduction is not 
permitted until payment. See 5 BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL 
TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS ¶	105.3.4 (3d ed. 2000). 
 59. See supra Table 1, for the basis–anti-basis analogy and its link to realization 
doctrine. 
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1. Cancelled by the Creditor 
Section 108(e)(2) provides that COD income does not arise “to 
the extent that payment of the liability would have given rise to a 
deduction.”60 This rule requires the taxpayer to consider the 
counterfactual, “if I paid this liability that is being cancelled, would I 
get a deduction?” If, as in our example, the answer is “yes,” then no 
COD income results. 
Section 108(e)(2) was added to the Code in the Bankruptcy Tax 
Act of 1980.61 The rationale for this rule is described obliquely in the 
legislative history as relating to “	‘lost’ deductions.”62 The House 
Report includes a useful example that clarifies the basic premise: 
“[A]ssume a cash-basis taxpayer owes $1,000 to its cash-basis 
employee as salary and has not actually paid such amount. If later the 
employee forgives the debt	.	.	.	then the discharge [would] not give 
rise to income or require any reduction of tax attributes.”63 
In the example, two aspects of the debtor’s tax position change 
when a deductible debt is cancelled, and they offset one another. 
First, there is the debt cancellation, which normally generates gross 
income. Second, the taxpayer loses the deduction that would have 
been permitted if the debt had been paid. The lost deduction exactly 
equals the gross income resulting from nonpayment. Because these 
amounts are equal and offsetting, there is no effect on net income.64 
The counterfactual inquiry required by §	108(e)(2) is the same as 
the test for anti-basis, articulated above. Thus, this is the first example 
we have seen where present law clearly (though tacitly) incorporates 
anti-basis. If payment of the liability would give rise to a deduction, 
then the liability has zero anti-basis. If anti-basis is zero, then no 
income should arise if the debt is cancelled by the creditor. 
What happens if payment of a cancelled liability would 
(counterfactually, if not cancelled) be classified as a capital 
expenditure, rather than a deductible cost? The statute does not 
address this situation, and I find no cases or rulings addressing the 
question. In an analogous context involving corporate tax, discussed 
below, the Treasury concluded in a published ruling that “the same 
principle applies to liabilities that give rise to capital expenditures.”65 
Anti-basis logic confirms this approach. If the taxpayer would 
 
 60. I.R.C. §	108(e)(2). 
 61. Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-589, 94 Stat. 3389. 
 62. H.R. REP. NO. 96-883, at 16 (1980). 
 63. S. REP. No. 96-1035, at 20 (1980).  
 64. BITTKER ET AL., supra note 26, ¶	4.05[3][e].  
 65. Rev. Rul. 95-74, 1995-2 C.B. 36; see also infra note 105 and accompanying text. 
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(counterfactually) be entitled to capitalize the cost corresponding to 
the liability into basis, then anti-basis must be zero. Just as with 
deductible liabilities, if anti-basis is zero then no income should arise 
on cancellation. 
2. Transferred in Asset Sale 
Return to the example involving Blackacre, a misplaced rock, 
and an injured child. If Blackacre is sold to a buyer who agrees to 
assume the seller’s obligation to pay the tort judgment, the tax 
consequences are well settled but more intricate than in prior 
examples. 
The seller’s amount realized equals the sum of the cash received 
from the buyer plus the value of the tort liability assumed by the 
buyer. The seller is deemed to make a payment on the liability (a 
fiction), which triggers the seller’s ability to claim a deduction.66 The 
buyer is given basis credit for the cash actually paid and also for the 
liability assumed (or, equivalently, for the sum of the cash the buyer 
actually pays plus the cash she notionally pays).67 The buyer is not 
permitted to claim a deduction when she satisfies the liability. A 
deduction is denied to the buyer when she pays the tort claim, even 
though it would have been permitted to the seller if the seller had 
paid the claim, because the buyer is given basis credit for assuming 
the liability, and allowing a deduction in addition to this tax basis 
would be double counting.68 
To make this concrete, suppose Blackacre is worth $10, has a tax 
basis of $6 in the seller’s hands, and that the liability to the victim is 
worth $3. If Blackacre were sold in a taxable transaction, the seller’s 
amount realized would be $10 ($7 cash received plus $3 liability 
shifted to the buyer), resulting in gain of $4 ($10 amount realized less 
$6 tax basis).69 Meanwhile, the seller would get a deduction for the 
 
 66. James M. Pierce Corp. v. Comm’r, 326 F.2d 67, 69 (8th Cir. 1964); Commercial 
Sec. Bank v. Comm’r, 77 T.C. 145, 149 (1981) (“[B]y accepting less cash for its assets in 
exchange for the assumption of its liabilities, [the seller] effectively paid the accrued 
liabilities at the time of the sale.”); cf. Treas. Reg. §	1.461-4(d)(5) (2015) (declaring an 
exception to the economic performance prerequisite for deduction accrual when, in the 
sale of a business, the shifted liability is included in the seller’s amount realized). 
 67. TAXATION OF INCOME vol. 2, supra note 25, ¶	41.2.2; cf. Crane v. Comm’r, 331 
U.S. 1, 14 (1947) (noting the reality that a buyer of property subject to a mortgage must 
treat the mortgage as if it were his own personal obligation because he would realize a 
benefit if the mortgage were discharged); Treas. Reg. §	1.1012-1(g) (2015) (“[I]f a debt 
instrument is issued in exchange for property, the cost of the property that is attributable 
to the debt instrument is the issue price of the debt instrument	.	.	.	.	”). 
 68. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
 69. I.R.C. §	1001(a), (b); Crane, 331 U.S. at 14. 
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“payment” of the $3 liability, leaving net income of $1.70 The net 
income might be a composite of capital gains and ordinary 
deductions, given that the $4 gain might be classified as a capital 
gain,71 whereas the $3 deduction for the tort liability would probably 
be set off against ordinary income.72 
The buyer’s basis in Blackacre would be $10, the combination of 
cash paid by and liability shifted to the buyer. The buyer wouldn’t get 
to deduct the $3 liability when payment was ultimately made to the 
tort victim. If, however, interest has accrued on the obligation to the 
tort victim after the sale but before the tort victim is paid, the interest 
will be deductible by the buyer, just as interest on the bank loan 
encumbering Blackacre would have been deductible by the buyer. 
Post-purchase interest was not consideration paid to the seller of 
Blackacre for the property, but a time charge imposed on the buyer in 
the first instance, and one for which the buyer has received no 
favorable tax attributes. 
Now think about the transaction using anti-basis. The act of 
selling Blackacre cum liability imposes a cash cost on the seller—
foregone sales proceeds attributable to the liability shift. Incurring 
this cost triggers the seller’s ability to claim the deduction. This 
deduction, in turn, generates anti-basis in the liability. At this point, 
given that the liability has anti-basis, the analysis degenerates into the 
earlier, simpler case of a fixed, nondeductible obligation such as a 
bank loan: The seller’s amount realized equals the cash received by 
the seller plus anti-basis in liabilities shifted from seller to buyer. 
From the buyer’s perspective, the assumption of a seller’s fixed 
liability always generates tax basis in the acquired asset—and thus 
anti-basis in the associated liability—so there is never any difference 
between liabilities that would and those that would not have been 
deductible by the seller. The buyer never gets a deduction when she 
pays the liability. 
There is a complication worth discussing. The example used to 
illustrate the present law treatment of fixed, deductible liabilities was 
chosen with care. I purposefully chose an example that did not 
involve surrogate taxation—the practice of denying one party to a 
transaction a deduction for an expense of a type ordinarily deductible 
because the other party to the transaction is not required to report 
 
 70. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
 71. This will be true if Blackacre is a “capital asset” under §	1221, or is treated as a 
capital asset under §	1231. 
 72. See §	165 (permitting deduction for losses). 
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the corresponding income. Deferred compensation is the classic 
example.73 
Suppose, in a world of uniform 40% tax rates and 10% pre-tax 
returns, an employee renders services at time 0 worth $100. In lieu of 
$100 of current compensation, the employer promises to pay the 
employee $106 at time 1.74 The now familiar tax policy insight is that, 
for income to be measured accurately, the employer can be allowed 
(a) a deduction of $100 at time 0 or (b) a deduction of $106 at time 1, 
$106 being the future value equivalent (at time 1) of a $100 payment 
at time 0. But if the employer is allowed a deduction of $100 at time 0, 
it may not be permitted to deduct the $6 increment between the 
amount of its deduction and the ultimate payment. This would result 
in a windfall to the employer.75 
Now suppose that the liability transferred with Blackacre is not a 
tort liability but rather this deferred compensation obligation. So it 
will mesh with the attributes assigned to Blackacre in the running 
example (market value $10, seller basis $4)—assume the deferred 
compensation obligation is for $3 (time 0 value, as of the sale), which 
is equivalent to $3 × $1.06 = $3.18 (time 1 value, when payment is due 
to the employee). If the buyer purchases Blackacre for total 
consideration of $10 ($7 cash plus $3 of liability assumption) some 
aspects of the tax treatment are clear and others are unsettled. It is 
clear that the seller’s amount realized is $10, so gain is $6. It is also 
clear that the buyer’s basis is $10. The unsettled questions are, first, 
whether the seller gets a compensation deduction at the time of the 
sale and, second, whether the buyer may deduct (or claim additional 
basis for) the $0.18 time value increment that is the difference 
between the value of the debt at the time of the sale ($3) and when 
the buyer pays the employee ($3.18). 
The answer to the first question—deductibility by the seller—is 
that the seller should in concept be allowed a $3 deduction but is 
denied a deduction under present law. As noted above, the 
regulations governing accrual of deductions deem economic 
performance—usually the gating item for deductibility by the seller—
to be satisfied when the seller includes the transferred liability in her 
 
 73. See generally Daniel I. Halperin, Interest in Disguise: Taxing the “Time Value of 
Money”, 95 YALE L.J. 506 (1986) (exploring transactions designed to avoid taxation as a 
mechanism to understand the time value of money). 
 74. This example is taken from Daniel Halperin, Assumption of Contingent Liabilities 
on Sale of a Business, 2 FLA. TAX REV. 673, 678–81 (1996). 
 75. Id. at 678–83. 
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amount realized.76 In the context of employee compensation, 
however, §	404(a)(5) supersedes this regulation.77 Section 404(a)(5) 
delays the deduction for deferred compensation paid by an accrual 
method taxpayer until the employee is required to include the 
income.78 Some commentators believe that the seller may claim a 
deduction at the time of the sale under present law, but even the most 
optimistic acknowledge that this position carries considerable risk of a 
successful IRS challenge.79 Delaying the seller’s deduction is 
unwarranted as a matter of policy, and the statutory rule should be 
modified to permit the deduction.80 
The second question—deductibility of the $0.18 difference 
between the time value of the liability when it is assumed and when it 
is paid—implicates anti-basis. Surrogate taxation of the employee 
requires that no deduction be permitted to the buyer for the $0.18. 
Thinking through this question using anti-basis, however, suggests a 
different answer. If the buyer is only given basis credit of $3 on 
account of the liability assumption, the implication is that the buyer’s 
anti-basis is $3. Payment of any greater sum should give rise to a 
deduction of the excess. If no deduction is permitted, the implication 
is that the buyer has anti-basis of $3.18, rather than $3. An anti-basis 
of $3.18, in turn, implies that the buyer’s basis in Blackacre should be 
$10.18, rather than $10. 
The apparent contradiction between the results—consistency 
with surrogate taxation on the one hand and proper accounting for 
anti-basis on the other—is illusory. The $0.18 deduction is denied to 
the buyer because the seller should have been permitted to deduct the 
$3 liability at time 0, which amounts to a complete tax accounting for 
the claim based on its value at that time. Allowing the buyer a further 
deduction for the difference between the time 0 and time 1 value of 
the claim would replicate part of the seller’s deduction. This is the 
correct justification for denying the buyer a deduction for the $0.18. 
The buyer’s anti-basis in the liability—and the corresponding portion 
of asset basis in Blackacre—is simply $3, just as with the tort liability. 
 
 76. See supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
 77. §	404(a)(5). 
 78. See id. 
 79. Robert H. Wellen, Contingent Consideration and Contingent Liabilities in 
Acquisitions, 45 WM. & MARY ANN. TAX CONF. li, 24 (1999); see also MARTIN D. 
GINSBURG, JACK S. LEVIN & DONALD E. ROCAP, MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS, AND 
BUYOUTS ¶	304.3 (Mar. 2014 ed.) (referring to the Service’s position that no deduction is 
permitted to the seller as “ridiculous”). 
 80. In this regard I agree with Halperin. See Halperin, supra note 74, at 710. 
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To further illustrate the point, consider that deferred 
compensation obligations accrue interest at after-tax rates, whereas 
tort judgments accrue interest at before-tax rates (this is true in 
theory, if not in practice).81 If this is true here, the buyer of Blackacre 
who takes the property and the tort judgment must set aside $3 to 
satisfy her obligation to the tort victim at time 1, considering the 
assumed 10% yield on the set aside and the corresponding deduction 
for interest paid on the judgment.82 The buyer of Blackacre subject to 
the deferred compensation obligation must likewise set aside $3 
considering the assumed 6% yield on the set aside and the lack of any 
corresponding deduction for interest paid on the deferred 
compensation.83 
3. Contributed to Controlled Corporation 
The rules governing shifts of fixed, deductible liabilities to a 
controlled corporation in a nonrecognition transaction are well 
settled. Unfortunately they are also complicated. Let’s begin with the 
playground-tort judgment variation of the running example, using the 
same values and tax attributes (Blackacre is worth $10, the owner’s 
tax basis in Blackacre is $4, and the liability to the victim is $3). 
Consistent with the rule discussed above for shifts of fixed, 
nondeductible liabilities to controlled corporations (illustrated using 
the bank loan),84 the liability shift to the corporation in this case 
would not be treated as boot, but contrary to that earlier example, the 
shareholder would not be required to reduce her stock basis on 
account of the liability assumption. The facts and outcome under 
current law are collated in the following table: 
  
 
 81. Even if this is false in practice, the distinction between deferred compensation 
obligations and tort judgments should be true in principle, and my goal here is to thresh 
out a conceptual understanding of the tax policy issues assuming the rest of the legal 
system has a coherent structure. See, e.g., Halperin, supra note 74, at 678–81 
(demonstrating that an employer supplying a pre-tax rate of return is tantamount to 
increasing the amount of deferred compensation). 
 82. Setting aside $3.00 will return $3.30, a pre-tax yield of $0.30, and payment will 
generate a deduction of $0.30 (the excess of the $3.30 payment over the $3.00 anti-basis). 
Thus there will be no net income on the set aside, which can be funded at time 0 for $3.00. 
 83. Setting aside $3.00 will return $3.30, a pre-tax yield of $0.30, and payment will 
generate no deduction for the reasons described in the text. Thus the pre-tax yield will be 
reduced to $0.30 × (1 – .4) = $0.18 after-tax, just enough to fund the $3.18 deferred 
compensation obligation at time 1. 
 84. See supra Section III.A.4. 
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Table 3: Transfer to a controlled corporation
    Fixed, deductible liability 
Shareholder’s position before 
the contribution: direct 
ownership of Blackacre 
Shareholder’s position after the 
contribution: indirect ownership 
of Blackacre 
Blackacre value 10 Stock value 7 
Basis 4 Stock basis  4 
Fixed, deductible 
liability 
3 Fixed, deductible 
liability 
0 
Net value 7 Net value  7 











3 (3 – 0) 
 
The difference between this case and the earlier case involving a 
transfer of a fixed, nondeductible liability is that the contributing 
shareholder in this case exchanges her asset basis for her stock basis 
without any reduction on account of the corporation’s assumption of 
the fixed, deductible liability.85 In the earlier case, such a reduction was 
required.86 A reduction in tax basis in the contributor’s stock is 
required for nondeductible liabilities because the gain to be preserved 
for future recognition is the difference between the unencumbered 
value of Blackacre and the contributor’s tax basis in Blackacre; when 
Blackacre is swapped for stock, the stock’s value equals the value of 
Blackacre reduced by the liability shifted to the corporation. It follows 
that the shareholder’s tax basis in the stock must be ratcheted down 
by the amount of the liability. With this adjustment, the difference 
between the value and tax basis of the contributor’s stock is the same 
as the difference between the value and tax basis of Blackacre prior 
to the contribution. In sum, a step down in stock basis equal to 
liabilities shifted to the corporation replicates in the contributor’s 
 
 85. See I.R.C. §§	357(c)(3), 358(d)(2). 
 86. See §	358(d)(1). 
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stock (no more and no less than) the contributor’s precontribution 
asset gain in Blackacre. 
In the case of fixed, deductible liabilities, the contributor has 
unrealized gain and also an inchoate deduction. In the example, the 
gain and deduction net to $3 ($6 unrealized gain less $3 inchoate 
deduction). If the contributor’s gain in Blackacre is replicated in her 
shares without an accounting for the lost deduction, the outcome 
would be punitive from the contributor’s point of view. She would go 
from inchoate net income of $3 before the contribution to inchoate 
net income of $6 afterwards. If she is not required to reduce her basis 
in her shares on account of the liability shifted to the corporation, 
then the contributor’s inchoate net income is the same after the 
contribution as it was before. This is the correct outcome and is 
required under present law.87 
This rule treating liability shifts to controlled corporations 
differently depending on whether they would give rise to a deduction 
for the contributing shareholder tacitly incorporates anti-basis.88 In 
other words, the more favorable result under present law for the tort 
claim (compared with the bank loan) depends on the counterfactual 
deductibility of the liability by the contributor. Thus, the test for anti-
basis is key to the operation of the rule. 
It would be simpler to state the rules for liability shifts to 
controlled corporations if the role of anti-basis in the analysis were 
made explicit: if a liability shifted to a corporation has anti-basis (the 
bank loan) then the contributor’s stock basis is the excess of basis in 
 
 87. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
 88. Section 357(c)(3), which defines the scope of the rule, reads as follows: 
(3) Certain liabilities excluded 
(A) In general 
If a taxpayer transfers, in an exchange to which section 351 applies, a 
liability the payment of which either— 
 (i) would give rise to a deduction, or 
 (ii) would be described in section 736(a), 
then, for purposes of paragraph (1), the amount of such liability shall be 
excluded in determining the amount of liabilities assumed. 
(B) Exception 
Subparagraph (A) shall not apply to any liability to the extent that the 
incurrence of the liability resulted in the creation of, or an increase in, the 
basis of any property. 
§	357(c)(3). 
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the contributed assets over anti-basis in shifted liabilities;89 if a 
liability shifted to a corporation lacks anti-basis (the tort claim) then 
the contributor’s stock basis is the same as the basis in the contributed 
assets, not reduced by the liability shift.90 
C. Contingent Liabilities 
1. The Problem 
Unlike fixed liabilities that might be either nondeductible (e.g., 
bank loan) or deductible (e.g., tort liability), as a first approximation 
all contingent liabilities are deductible.91 It is the nature of most 
contingent liabilities that no value was received by the obligor at the 
time the contingent liability arose. The tort claim in the earlier 
example was a fixed, deductible liability because the claim by the 
victim was resolved by settlement or judgment (making the liability 
fixed and determinable, in tax jargon). The claim began, however, as 
a contingent liability when the victim was injured and had a potential 
cause of action against the owner of Blackacre. When the accident 
happened, the owner of Blackacre received no value (no sum 
analogous to the proceeds on the bank loan) correlating to the 
liability. In general, there is no receipt of value correlating to 
contingent liabilities when they arise. It follows that contingent 
liabilities have zero anti-basis. 
The tax treatment of contingent liabilities is straightforward 
when the taxpayer originally liable remains liable through resolution 
of the claim by payment, default, or a determination that no amount 
is due. If the contingent liability is paid, then the taxpayer takes a 
deduction when the liability is paid or accrued. There is no anti-basis 
to absorb the payment as there is for nondeductible liabilities like the 
bank loan. If the contingent liability has value but the taxpayer 
defaults, there is no tax consequence. Recall that there is no COD 
income on discharge of a liability with zero anti-basis.92 If it is 
ultimately determined that no amount is due, evaporation of the 
potential claim has no tax consequence. Essentially, in every case, the 
 
 89. If anti-basis in shifted liabilities is greater than basis in contributed assets, the 
excess is gain and stock basis is zero. See §	357(c). 
 90. See §§	357(c)(3), 358(d)(2). 
 91. There is a small class of contingent liabilities that are nondeductible (that is, have 
anti-basis). An example is a contingent liability to pay a fine or penalty that is 
nondeductible because of §	162(f). This class of liabilities is discussed below. See infra 
Section IV.D. 
 92. See §	108(e)(2); see also supra Section III.B.1 (discussing §	108(e)(2)). 
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passage of time resolves the contingency and the proper tax treatment 
follows automatically. 
On the other hand, when contingent liabilities are shifted—either 
in an asset sale or a contribution to a controlled corporation—the tax 
treatment of the liability shift is confused as a matter of doctrine.93 
This is not surprising given that the underlying tax policy issues are 
complicated in the abstract and become even more complicated when 
administrative considerations are factored into rule design. 
The fundamental issue is one of categorization. Contingent 
liabilities lie on a continuum between fixed, deductible liabilities on 
the one hand and potential future costs on the other. “Potential 
future costs” refers to a category even more attenuated than 
contingent liabilities. Everyone agrees that potential future costs 
shifted in asset sales are (and should be) ignored in figuring the tax 
consequences for both the seller and the buyer.94 
The large number of articles and bar association reports 
regarding the treatment of contingent liabilities represent a seemingly 
interminable tug-of-war between (a) those who favor treating 
contingent liabilities like fixed, deductible liabilities and (b) those 
who favor treating contingent liabilities like potential future costs, 
which is to say those who favor ignoring them.95 No commentator or 
policymaker has, to my knowledge, raised the possibility of fashioning 
a new regime applicable only to contingent liabilities. 
 
 93. An enormous literature exists on this subject. See, e.g., Charlotte Crane, 
Accounting for Assumed Liabilities Not Yet Accrued by the Seller: Is a Buyer’s Deduction 
Really Costless?, 48 TAX NOTES 225, 225–26 (1990); Charlotte Crane, More on Accounting 
for the Assumption of Contingent Liabilities, 3 FLA. TAX REV. 615, 636–41 (1997) 
[hereinafter Crane, More on Accounting]; Halperin, supra note 74, at 675; Kevin M. 
Keyes, The Treatment of Liabilities in Taxable Asset Acquisitions, 50 INST. ON FED. TAX’N 
§	21.01, at 21–2 (1992); Richard L. Reinhold, New York State Bar Ass’n Tax Section, 
Report on Federal Income Tax Treatment of Contingent Liabilities, 49 TAX NOTES 883, 884 
(1990); Robert R. Wootton, Mrs. Logan’s Ghost: The Open Transaction Doctrine Today, 
71 TAXES 725, 725 (1993); Alfred D. Youngwood, The Tax Treatment of Contingent 
Liabilities in Taxable Asset Acquisitions, 44 TAX LAW 765, 782 (1991). 
 94. See, e.g., Crane, More on Accounting, supra note 93, at 636–37; Halperin, supra 
note 74, at 700; Keyes, supra note 93, §	21.04[2][a][i]–[ii]; Wootton, supra note 93, at 740; 
Youngwood, supra note 93, at 784–85. 
 95. Compare Halperin, supra note 74, at 700 (advocating for ignoring contingent 
liabilities), with Youngwood, supra note 93, at 784–85 (arguing for granting a deduction 
for the buyer “at the time the seller would have received the deduction had the sale not 
taken place”). If option (a) is chosen, further specification is necessary: if accounting is 
potentially required before the liability becomes fixed such accounting can be made based 
on estimated values or instead can be deferred until valuation is established (a wait-and-
see approach referred to as “open transaction” accounting). 
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Assuming, consistent with the thrust of the debate, that these 
three types of obligations are to be split into two groups, arbitrary line 
drawing along the continuum is unavoidable. Anti-basis sheds no light 
on where to draw the line. It is nevertheless useful to walk through 
the permutations using anti-basis as a guide. Doing so highlights the 
policy implications of the choice between available options. 
2. Shifted in Asset Sale 
To see what turns on the classification in a taxable asset sale, 
recall the basic facts of the running example: Blackacre is worth $10 
and the owner’s basis is $6. Now let’s suppose that due to the grading 
of the Blackacre’s slope, water is running off the land and damaging 
the neighbor’s property. The neighbor has a potential cause of action 
against the owner of Blackacre. The neighbor’s claim relates to prior 
events but the liability, if any, is not fixed and determinable. All 
things considered, the contingent liability has an expected value of 
$3.96 
If Blackacre is sold for cash, the buyer will pay $7, assuming the 
contingent liability follows the land. Assume initially that the 
contingent liability is accounted for under the rules for fixed, 
deductible liabilities. If the liability were accounted for at the time of 
the sale rather than under a wait-and-see approach,97 the seller should 
have total net income of $1, considering both gain and deductions. 
Observe that the seller came to the transaction with property with a 
built in gain of $10 – $6 = $4 and a liability representing an inchoate 
tax deduction with an expected value of $3. Here is a summary: 
 
Item Amount Computation 
1. Cash received 7  
2. Contingent liability shifted 3  
3. Amount realized  10 line 1 + line 2 
4. Adjusted basis 6  
5. Gain realized  4 line 3 – line 4 
 
 96. By “all things considered” I mean the probable remedy, the likelihood of success, 
the time value of money, and so forth. 
 97. See supra note 95; see also Wootton, supra note 93, at 738–42 (evaluating the 
unsettled question of whether the transaction would be treated as closed or open under 
present law). 
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6. Deduction  3 line 2 
7. Net income  1 line 5 – line 6 
 
Accounting for the contingent liability as though it were fixed 
means that the buyer’s basis in Blackacre will be $10. The buyer will 
have anti-basis in the liability of $3. This anti-basis derives from the 
$3 of tax basis in Blackacre generated by the liability assumption. 
Permitting the buyer to claim this basis and to deduct the liability 
when it comes due would be double counting; if the liability has anti-
basis no deduction is allowed, so there is no double counting. 
If, instead, the contingent liability is ignored, then the seller’s 
amount realized is the $7 cash received. Hence, gain is $7 – $6 = $1. 
This is the same as the seller’s net income when the liability was 
factored in; however, depending on the nature of the property and 
taxpayer type, when the liability is factored into the amount realized 
and deducted, there might be a character shift. Specifically, the 
incremental gain might enjoy the capital gains rate preference, 
whereas the deduction will set off ordinary income. Thus, for at least 
some sellers, accounting for liability explicitly is better than ignoring 
it. 
If the contingent liability is ignored, the buyer takes a tax basis of 
$7 in Blackacre—which is worse than the $10 tax basis under the 
alternative characterization—but the buyer is now permitted to 
deduct the liability when paid. The liability was consideration paid by 
the buyer in an economic sense, but no basis credit was given to the 
buyer; ergo, no anti-basis. This deduction is allowed if and when the 
claim is paid and in the amount ultimately determined. 
As a general proposition, whether buyers are helped or hurt by 
one approach or the other depends on the relative pace of (a) the cost 
recovery deductions the buyer would have been allowed if the 
contingent claim were added to basis and (b) the deductions the 
buyer is allowed when the contingent claim is paid. Given that the 
amount deducted will be equal (at least in expectation) either way, 
whichever results in earlier deduction is better. In our example, 
ignoring the contingent claim unambiguously provides a benefit 
because Blackacre is nondepreciable, but it could go either way in 
other cases where the property is eligible for cost recovery 
deductions. 
Thus, sometimes the seller and buyer stand on opposite sides of 
the issue with one preferring to account for the contingent liabilities 
and the other preferring to ignore them. This would be true of an 
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individual seller eligible for the preferential character flip (capital 
gain and ordinary deduction) and a buyer, when, as with Blackacre, 
the property is nondepreciable. If it is usually true that buyer and 
seller have contradictory preferences, there is an argument—from a 
practical standpoint—for treating contingent liabilities like fixed, 
deductible liabilities since the parties’ competing interests will 
encourage accurate valuation of contingent liabilities when 
accounting for the transaction. This approach also avoids the hard 
question of where to set the boundary between fixed, deductible 
liabilities and contingent liabilities.98 
If buyers and sellers do not ordinarily have conflicting interests 
regarding valuation, then lumping contingent liabilities in with fixed, 
deductible liabilities might open up avenues of abuse. Sellers and 
buyers could conspire to lower their effective marginal tax rates by 
exaggerating (or minimizing) the value assigned to contingent claims; 
the only loser in the bargain would be the fisc. 
3. Contributed to Controlled Corporation 
To summarize current law, described above at length using 
conventional terminology,99 the contributing shareholder’s stock basis 
is the excess of her asset basis over her anti-basis (if any) in liabilities 
shifted to the corporation.100 The recipient corporation takes a 
transferred asset basis and liability anti-basis from the contributing 
shareholder.101 To this extent, the rules make sense and usually work 
well—they are clear, administrable, and well understood. With the 
help of anti-basis, they are also easy to state. 
I say these rules usually work well. They broke down in 
spectacular fashion in the mid-1990s when several taxpayers tried to 
exploit the rule that liabilities without anti-basis can be transferred to 
a controlled corporation without ratcheting down the contributing 
shareholder’s stock on account of the liability shift.102 In a 
prototypical exploitative transaction, the shareholder (usually itself a 
corporation) would contribute $100 of cash and $99 of contingent 
 
 98. Wootton, supra note 93, at 741 (noting the difficulty of distinguishing between 
contingent and fixed liabilities). 
 99. See supra Sections III.A.4, III.B.3. 
 100. If anti-basis exceeds basis then §	357(c) gain results. I.R.C.	§	357(c)(1). 
 101. §	358(a)(1). 
 102. See, e.g., WFC Holdings Corp. v. United States, 728 F.3d 736, 739–42 (8th Cir. 
2013); Coltec Indus., Inc. v. United States, 454 F.3d 1340, 1343–45 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Black 
& Decker Corp. v. United States, 436 F.3d 431, 433–34 (4th Cir. 2006). See generally Ethan 
Yale, Reexamining Black & Decker’s Contingent Liability Tax Shelter, 108 TAX NOTES 223 
(2005) (analyzing Black & Decker’s “contingent liability tax shelter”). 
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(deductible) liabilities to a newly formed corporation in exchange for 
stock. The contributing shareholder would then sell its stock for its 
market value of $1 (equal to the $100 cash held by the corporation set 
off by the $99 negative expected value of the contingent liabilities). 
The contributing shareholder would argue that its basis in the stock 
was $100—equal to its basis in the contributed cash not reduced by 
the contingent deductible liabilities—and thus would claim a $99 
loss.103 
No reduction in share basis is required on account of the 
liabilities shifted to the new corporation, the argument goes, because 
under the plain terms of the Code, the shareholder is not required to 
step down basis on account of deductible liability shifts.104 Later, 
when the new corporation pays the liability, it is permitted a 
deduction of $99, or the future value equivalent (assuming the 
liability was valued accurately). The contributing shareholder argues 
that the corporation’s deduction for the claim is correct under the 
Service’s official position, articulated in a revenue ruling.105 Thus the 
main benefit of the transaction is that it duplicates the tax benefit 
inherent in the transferred liability. 
In terms of anti-basis, why does the transferee corporation take 
the contingent liability with anti-basis of zero? Put in conventional 
terminology, why is it true that the transferee corporation may deduct 
the contingent liability when it is paid or accrued? The reason to 
doubt this is true is that if the liability were shifted to a buyer in a 
taxable sale as part of an asset-liability package (like our Blackacre 
examples), the buyer would count the liability shift as part of its cost 
and factor this cost into its basis in the purchased assets. This, in turn, 
implies the liability has anti-basis for the buyer-transferee and is 
nondeductible. If the analysis is different for §	351 exchanges, one 
would expect to find a persuasive rationale or legal authority—
hopefully both. 
The rationale that has been offered by the Service for allowing 
the transferee a deduction even though the shifted liability represents 
part of its cost for the acquired property is “the specific congressional 
intent of §	351(a) to facilitate the incorporation of an ongoing 
business by making the incorporation tax free.”106 The Service has 
concluded that this intent would be frustrated if liabilities that would 
 
 103. See I.R.S. Notice 2001-17, 2001-9 I.R.B. 730 (designating the “Contingent Liability 
Tax Shelter” as a listed transaction). 
 104. See §§	357(c)(3), 358(d)(2). 
 105. Rev. Rul. 95-74, 1995-2 C.B. 36, 38. 
 106. Id. 
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have been deducted by the transferor cannot be deducted by the 
transferee.107 This might be true in some situations, but it is not self-
evident.108 
Importantly, the proffered rationale is emphatically not 
convincing in the prototypical exploitative transaction sketched out 
above. In that transaction, the taxpayer went into the §	351 
transaction with an inchoate $99 deduction for the contingent liability 
and walked out with a $99 built-in-loss in its subsidiary stock. The 
built-in-loss is an adequate (indeed, seemingly perfect) substitute for 
the inchoate deduction, and the contributor would not be impeded 
from doing the transaction for nontax business reasons if the 
transferee corporation were not permitted to deduct the liability. 
The legal authority supporting the transferee-corporation’s 
ability to deduct the contingent liability when it is paid or accrued is 
Revenue Ruling 95-74, which articulates the (sometimes 
unconvincing) rationale discussed above.109 The facts of the ruling 
involve a taxpayer who contributes substantially all of the assets and 
liabilities associated with a manufacturing business, including land 
contaminated by hazardous waste.110 The obligation to remediate this 
waste is the contingent liability shifted in the ruling.111 The ruling is 
clear that the transfer of the manufacturing business (including the 
contingent liability) is made “for bona fide business purposes” 
unrelated to tax avoidance.112 
 
 107. Id. 
 108. There is another rationale supporting the conclusion that the recipient 
corporation should not have anti-basis in the shifted liability, but it has not been raised 
before to my knowledge. Although it is true that the liability shift is consideration paid by 
the transferee corporation for the assets transferred, the transferee corporation gets no 
basis credit for the liability shift. See §	362(b). Rather, basis transfers from the contributing 
shareholder to the transferee corporation under §	362(b). If asset basis carries over, maybe 
liability anti-basis should carry over too. This argument is conceptually sound: Asset basis 
would be the benefit to the transferee from which anti-basis would derive, and here no 
asset basis is created; however, this argument is not supported by the statute. See 
Holdcroft Transp. Co. v. Comm’r, 153 F.2d 323, 324–25 (8th Cir. 1946) (pointing out that 
deductibility by the transferee even if theoretically appropriate would require statutory 
support, which is lacking). 
 109. See Rev. Rul. 95-74, 1995-2 C.B. 36, 38. 
 110. Id. at 36. 
 111. See id. 
 112. Id. Though the ruling is somewhat vague, a reasonable inference is that the 
Service had in mind a transaction in which built-in-gain assets were being contributed 
alongside the contingent liability so, in toto, as many or more gains were duplicated as 
losses, so there was no net tax benefit. 
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Case law does not support this ruling.113 In Holdcroft 
Transportation Co. v. Commissioner,114 the Eighth Circuit held that 
payments by a transferee corporation of liabilities that had been 
shifted in a §	351 transaction were not deductible by the transferee 
corporation even when they would have been deductible if they had 
been paid or accrued by the transferor.115 The Holdcroft court 
reasoned that assumption of the transferred liability was “part of the 
consideration for the acquisition” by the transferee corporation of the 
assets transferred, and must be accounted for as “part of the cost of 
acquisition.”116 The court thus concluded that the transferee 
corporation was not permitted to deduct the assumed liabilities when 
paid.117 In terms of anti-basis, the court reasoned that the transferee 
corporation had anti-basis in the assumed liability. 
Thus, when the cases involving contingent liability tax shelters 
arose, the Service had good legal support for denying the transferee 
corporation a deduction on the transferred claim and weak or no 
technical support for denying the transferor corporation the ability to 
harvest the built-in-loss on its subsidiary stock. Faced with this 
scenario, one might have expected the Service to pursue the 
transferee corporation when it sought to deduct the transferred claim. 
Instead, in every case, the government made losing technical 
arguments against the transferor in an attempt to deny its ability to 
deduct the built-in-loss on the subsidiary stock, but ultimately won by 
convincing the courts that the economic substance doctrine applied.118 
Congress ultimately amended the statute in 2000 to add §	358(h), 
which requires the contributing shareholder to step down its stock 
basis in transactions taking the form of our prototype.119 More 
specifically, if a liability without anti-basis is shifted in a §	351 transfer 
and the contributor winds up with a built-in-loss in its stock, stock 
 
 113. Indeed, the Service ruled on the issue of the transferee’s deductibility to voice its 
disagreement with the Holdcroft court. 
 114. 153 F.2d 323 (8th Cir. 1946). 
 115. Id. at 325. 
 116. Id. at 324. 
 117. Id. at 325. 
 118. See WFC Holdings Corp. v. United States, 728 F.3d 736, 745–46 (8th Cir. 2013); 
Coltec Indus., Inc. v. United States, 454 F.3d 1340, 1349, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Black & 
Decker Corp. v. United States, 436 F.3d 431, 436–37, 441–42 (4th Cir. 2006). Very 
generally, the economic substance doctrine is a common law doctrine that courts apply to 
deny tax benefits from arguably technically compliant transactions that were undertaken 
solely or primarily to avoid taxes. See generally Joseph Bankman, Economic Substance 
Doctrine, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 5 (2000) (providing an overview of the economic substance 
doctrine). 
 119. Act of Mar. 9, 2009, Pub. L. No. 107-147, §	412(c), 116 Stat. 21. 
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basis must be reduced by the amount of the liability or the built-in-
loss, whichever is less.120 The rule is shut off when the facts are like 
those assumed in revenue Ruling 95-74—that is, when the liability is 
associated with the business or assets being contributed.121 
Thinking through this rule with anti-basis reveals this statutory 
fix to be a convoluted solution to the problem. Rather than fall back 
on the basic rule for taxable exchanges and assign anti-basis to the 
transferee corporation, which would be an elegant and complete 
solution, in affected transactions the liability that began without anti-
basis for the contributing shareholder apparently remains without 
anti-basis for the recipient corporation (on the strength of Revenue 
Ruling 95-74, the domain of which should, as a conceptual matter, be 
expanded by §	358(h)). The statute converts the anti-basis that would 
arise for the transferee corporation in a taxable exchange into share-
basis reduction for the transferor. When applied, this rule prevents 
the abuse at which it was aimed, but it is divorced from basic 
principles and is more complicated than need be. 
D. Noncapital, Nondeductible Costs 
Most liabilities related to noncapital, nondeductible costs arise in 
the personal context. To begin with an example that will be familiar 
to most readers, suppose a taxpayer signs a note with a value 
ultimately determined to be $500,000 in exchange for gambling chips 
at a casino and then loses all the chips at the craps table.122 The 
taxpayer walks out of the casino without tax basis in any asset 
financed with the loan.123 Neither are any of her gambling losses 
deductible.124 Yet she has anti-basis in the liability. Payment of the 
$500,000 debt is a consumption expense, and consumption was the 
benefit related to the liability in question. 
Next, consider a taxpayer who is a debtor on a judgment debt of 
$100 stemming from a (non-business) tort suit. Say the taxpayer was 
at fault in a car wreck, and the $100 is the amount of the judgment or 
settlement in favor of the victim. Does the taxpayer have anti-basis in 
the judgment debt? Superficially, it appears that no benefit was 
received, which would imply that there is no anti-basis. Functionally 
 
 120. I.R.C. §	358(h)(1). 
 121. §	358(h)(2); see Rev. Rul. 95-74, 1995-2 C.B. 36, 38. 
 122. These are the basic facts of Zarin v. Comm’r, 916 F.2d 110, 111–12 (3d Cir. 1990). 
 123. The position that the taxpayer took tax basis in the gambling chips in the amount 
of the loan is logically coherent, but it is ruled out (at least in the Third Circuit) by Zarin. 
Id. at 114 (holding that gambling chips are not “property”). 
 124. §	165(d). 
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this is the wrong answer. If the judgment debt is discharged without 
payment, current law would assign COD income of $100, which, in a 
system articulated in terms of anti-basis, only follows if the judgment 
debt has anti-basis. So we must dig deeper. 
Plainly the taxpayer did not get basis in any asset as a 
consequence of the victim’s damages. Hence there is only a benefit in 
this example if the $100 judgment debt represents consumption. This 
turns out to be the correct way to think about cases of this type, but 
the analysis is admittedly a bit tortured. Consider that if the taxpayer 
had insured the risk that ripened into the judgment, the premium for 
insurance would have been just another nondeductible cost tethered 
to operating her personal-use vehicle, like gas. Going uninsured (or 
underinsured) subjects the taxpayer in our example to some chance of 
having to self-insure, and the judgment debt in our example is the cost 
of such self-insurance (valued ex post, when the risk has already come 
home to roost), which is a form of consumption. 
Though unusual, at least some noncapital, nondeductible costs 
arise in the business context. Imagine that Blackacre, property used in 
a trade or business, is subject to a lien securing payment of a fine 
relating to the owner’s use of the property in contravention of local 
zoning laws. The fine is nondeductible,125 which implies it has anti-
basis. Where did the anti-basis come from? Anti-basis is the untaxed 
benefit that a taxpayer enjoys as a concomitant of an increase in the 
liabilities (or obligations) to which the taxpayer is subject. Here there 
was no untaxed benefit (at least none that is obvious). 
The best answer is that anti-basis in noncapital, nondeductible 
costs comes from the public policy underpinning the particular rule 
rendering the cost noncapital and nondeductible. As a functional 
matter, fidelity to the policy choice that supports the rule of 
nondeductibility means the liability must be assigned anti-basis. This 
is an inelegant explanation, but it should be no surprise that defining 
net income for tax purposes in service of nontax regulatory goals 
requires unsightly patchwork. 
As others have argued, in a system conforming to the accepted 
economic definition of income, the fine would be deductible when 
paid.126 This would put the output of the anti-basis test (no anti-basis) 
and the conceptual underpinning of the test (no untaxed benefit 
related to the liability) in harmony with one another. As noted in the 
 
 125. §	162(f). 
 126. See David I. Walker, Suitable for Framing: Business Deductions in a Net Income 
Tax System, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1247, 1251–57 (2011). 
94 N.C. L. REV. 485 (2016) 
520 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94 
introduction, the contradiction between definition and test in cases of 
this sort is evidence of tension between fundamental theoretical 
concepts and present-law rules. It is not evidence of a wrinkle in the 
anti-basis concept itself. 
Finally, some noncapital, nondeductible costs arise at the 
business-personal borderline. Take, for example, the rule that only 
one-half of business-related expenses for meals and entertainment are 
deductible.127 The Ways and Means Committee explained that “some 
portion of business meal and entertainment expenses represent 
personal consumption (even if the expenses serve a legitimate 
business purpose)	.	.	.	.	[D]enial of some part of the deduction is 
appropriate as a proxy for income inclusion of the consumption 
element of the meal or entertainment.”128 Suppose that the cost of a 
meal is paid on credit and the resulting liability is discharged without 
payment. Think of Artie Bucco cancelling the tab for Tony Soprano’s 
many “business” meals at Artie’s Italian restaurant. One-half of 
Tony’s tab was at least arguably deductible (zero anti-basis) and, to 
this extent, cancellation should not generate income.129 The other half 
of the liability (the nondeductible half, i.e., the half with anti-basis) 
should generate income when cancelled. 
IV. ADVANCED EXAMPLES 
Thus far I have defined anti-basis and given a test for its 
existence. I have also illustrated how the concept is woven into the 
present law rules regarding transactions involving discharge of 
liabilities, default on liabilities, and shifting of liabilities from one 
taxpayer to another. Now I will turn to some more sophisticated 
situations in which anti-basis arises, beginning with the original issue 
discount (“OID”) rules. 
A. OID Rules 
The concept underlying anti-basis is fundamental to the OID 
rules. The OID rules function by setting at issuance a debt’s “issue 
price” and the schedule of calibrated, periodic increases to the issue 
 
 127. §	274(n). 
 128. H.R. REP. NO. 103–111, at 645 (1993). Boris Bittker put it better when he 
explained that “[b]y joining in the merriment, the taxpayer who pays the bill usually 
derives personal benefits from the activity.” TAXATION OF INCOME vol. 1, supra note 32, 
¶ 21.2.1. 
 129. I am assuming that Tony has not claimed any deduction yet at the time the tab is 
cancelled. If he has claimed his one-half deduction, then this generated anti-basis in the 
liability equal to the amount deducted, and cancelation would generate income in the full 
amount of the tab. 
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price set to occur through maturity to reflect accretion of compound 
interest.130 Each increase is treated for tax purposes as accrued 
interest for both borrower and lender. The sum of a debt’s issue price 
and the cumulative scheduled increases to a given date is referred to 
as the debt’s “adjusted issue price.”131 
At issuance, a debt’s issue price, and thereafter the debt’s 
adjusted issue price, is identical to the borrower’s anti-basis in the 
debt. This identity exists because adjusted issue price is the sum of (a) 
issue price, equal to the borrower’s receipt of cash without income, 
and (b) the borrower’s deductions for “phantom interest” 
payments—that is, deductions for accrued but unpaid interest 
accreting on the debt.132 The sum of these two items equals the benefit 
to the borrower of incurring the debt. This is the definition of anti-
basis. 
Borrowers will sometimes be able to cancel OID debts at a 
discount if interest rates rise or if creditworthiness deteriorates while 
the debt is outstanding. In the context of a bond or loan bearing 
periodic interest at market rates (like the bank loan in the earlier 
examples), I explained that the borrower would have COD income on 
repayment if the borrower’s anti-basis exceeds the cost to the 
borrower of extinguishing the debt.133 For OID bonds, this rule is 
articulated in regulations under §	61 in virtually identical terms if one 
substitutes “adjusted issue price” for “anti-basis.” The relevant 
language is set out in the footnote.134 
In the converse scenario—if rates fall or if creditworthiness 
improves—the borrower might be required to pay a premium if it 
wishes to cancel its debt before maturity. The regulations provide that 
“if a debt instrument is repurchased by the issuer for a price in excess 
 
 130. §	1272(a). 
 131. §	1272(a)(3), (4). 
 132. Here I am imagining a debt that calls for neither any payments of stated 
redemption price at maturity (“SRPM”) before the debt is extinguished in full nor any 
payments of qualified stated interest (“QSI”). In other words, I am imagining a zero-
coupon bond that is not an installment obligation. Anti-basis and adjusted issue price are 
still identical if the debt is an installment obligation, or if it pays QSI in addition to OID, 
or if both of these things are true, but the explanation becomes more tedious. See DAVID 
C. GARLOCK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF DEBT INSTRUMENTS ¶¶ 505, 507 (6th ed. 
2010).  
 133. See supra text accompanying note 44. 
 134. Treasury Regulation §	1.61-12(c)(2)(ii) provides as follows: “An issuer realizes 
income from the discharge of indebtedness upon the repurchase of a debt instrument for 
an amount less than its adjusted issue price	.	.	.	.	The amount of discharge of indebtedness 
income is equal to the excess of the adjusted issue price over the repurchase price.” Treas. 
Reg. §	1.61-12(c)(2)(ii) (as amended in 1997). 
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of its adjusted issue price	.	.	.	, the excess (repurchase premium) is 
deductible as interest for the taxable year in which the repurchase 
occurs.”135 For an OID loan, the exclusion of the loan proceeds from 
income and the allowance of a deduction for accrued but unpaid 
interest are both justified by the expectation that, in the end, the 
borrower will repay the adjusted issue price (which equals the loan 
proceeds plus the accrued but unpaid interest).136 If the borrower pays 
more than this, a deduction is proper and is permitted by the quoted 
regulation. Again this rule is implemented using anti-basis in concept, 
though not in name. 
B. Premium and Discount Liability Shifts 
The OID rules would form the basis of a conceptually coherent 
approach to accounting for asset sales where the consideration paid 
by the buyer includes accepting a liability shift. Congress originally 
envisioned that the OID rules would be used for this purpose. In 1984 
Congress overhauled the time value of money rules, creating the 
modern OID regime.137 In the original legislation, Congress explicitly 
authorized the Treasury to write regulations that would have applied 
the OID rules to transactions involving debt shifts.138 This provision 
proved controversial, however, and, bowing to pressure from the real 
estate lobby, Congress amended the statute in 1985 to rule out the use 
of OID concepts when accounting for debt shifts unless “the terms 
and conditions of such debt instrument are modified (or the nature of 
the transaction is changed) in connection with the assumption (or 
acquisition).”139 
 
 135. Treas. Reg. §	1.163-7(c) (as amended in 2001). 
 136. Technically, the expectation is that the borrower will repay the “[s]tated 
redemption price at maturity[,]” which always equals the adjusted issue price of the debt 
at maturity. I.R.C.	§	1273(a)(2); GARLOCK, supra note 132, ¶ 505.  
 137. For a first-hand account of the history of the OID legislation, see GARLOCK, 
supra note 132, ¶	514. 
 138. §	1275(d). 
 139. See §	1274(c)(4); GARLOCK, supra note 132, ¶	310.01 (“Almost before the ink was 
dry on the 1984 Act, [the provision authorizing regulatory extension of the OID rules to 
assumptions] became controversial. The real estate lobby argued, in effect, that §	1274 
should be limited to ‘abusive’ transactions and that selling property subject to a below-
market debt was not an abuse, at least when the debt bore a market interest rate when the 
initial loan was made.”).  
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1. Present Law 
The decision not to apply the OID rules to liability shifts (barring 
a modification)140 means both the portion of the seller’s amount 
realized and the buyer’s basis attributable to the liability shift are 
determined based on the liability’s face amount, not its value.141 In 
other words, premiums and discounts on liabilities are usually ignored 
when liabilities are shifted in asset sales. This results in systematic 
character and timing errors for both the buyer and seller; on the 
bright side, ignoring premiums and discounts on liability shifts makes 
tax administration simpler. 
First consider a premium loan. Suppose that Blackacre (worth 
$10 with a basis to the seller of $4) is encumbered by a liability with a 
market value of $3 and a face amount of $2.70.142 If the lender agrees 
to permit a shift of the liability from the seller to a buyer paying an 
arm’s length price, the buyer would pay $7 cash, Blackacre’s net 
value. 
Under current law, the seller’s amount realized and the buyer’s 
basis both would be $7 + $2.70 = $9.70.143 Thus the seller’s tax gain 
would be $9.70 – $4 = $5.70. This is $0.30 (5%) less than the seller’s 
economic gain. The shortfall equals the seller’s financing loss on the 
loan shifted to the buyer.144 The $0.30 excess of the buyer’s economic 
cost for Blackacre over her tax basis will be written off over the term 
of the loan in the form of above-market interest deductions. 
In this example, ignoring the loan premium probably hurts the 
seller and helps the buyer. The seller is hurt because the financing loss 
would be ordinary and the offsetting gain on Blackacre would likely 
be capital.145 The buyer is helped because basis in Blackacre is 
 
 140. “Modification” is a term of art. See Treas. Reg. §	1.1001-3 (2011) (codifying the 
holding in Cottage Sav. Ass’n v. Comm’r, 499 U.S. 554, 560–68 (1991)). 
 141. See generally Treas. Reg. §§	1.1001-1(g), 1.1012-1(g) (1996) (specifying the amount 
realized attributable to the debt assumption and the cost basis attributable to the debt, 
respectively). For a discussion of the exceptions to this rule, see id. §	1.1274-5; GARLOCK, 
supra note 132, ¶ 310.02. See generally Alvin H. Shrago, The Uncertain Tax Treatment of 
Liabilities in Corporate Acquisitions, 52 N.Y.U. ANN. INST. FED. TAX’N, §§	19.01–19.07 
(1994) (discussing the complexity of OID rules and confusion surrounding the nature of 
the seller’s indebtedness and face-amount bias).  
 142. Interest rates have fallen since the loan was extended, creditworthiness has 
improved, or some combination. 
 143. See I.R.C. §	274(n); see also supra note 130 and accompanying text. 
 144. Had the seller’s basis in Blackacre been $9 rather than $4, the $0.30 reduction in 
gain would have been 30% less than her economic gain. If her basis were $9.70, the 
percentage reduction in her gain would be 100%. 
 145. A corporate seller might be indifferent, given the lack of a corporate capital gains 
preference. 
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nondepreciable, but the incremental interest cost attributable to the 
premium loan can be written off over the remaining term of the loan. 
Next consider a discount loan. Blackacre (worth $10 with a basis 
to the seller of $4) is encumbered by a liability with a market value of 
$3 and a face amount of $3.30.146 Just as in the prior example, if the 
lender agrees to permit a shift of the liability from the seller to a 
buyer paying an arm’s length price, the buyer would pay $7 cash, 
Blackacre’s net value. 
Under current law, the seller’s amount realized and the buyer’s 
basis both would be $7 + $3.30 = $10.30. Thus the seller’s tax gain 
would be $10.30 – $4 = $6.30. This is $0.30 cents (5%) more than the 
seller’s economic gain. The excess is attributable to the seller’s 
financing gain on the loan. The $0.30 excess of the buyer’s tax basis 
over her real cost should, in concept, be deductible interest, but it is 
locked up in her nondepreciable basis in Blackacre. 
Here, ignoring the loan discount probably helps the seller and 
hurts the buyer. The seller is helped because her financing gain is 
likely mischaracterized as capital gain.147 The buyer is hurt because 
what is economically interest cost (usually deductible) is treated as 
cost basis in nondepreciable property. In other examples, buyers 
might be helped if the asset gives off depreciation deductions that are 
allowed more quickly than interest deductions. 
2. Hidden in Plain Sight 
The present-law practice of ignoring premiums and discounts of 
shifted liabilities is underappreciated. This is attributable, at least 
partly, to a lack of adequate terminology. If the term anti-basis (or 
some other term of equivalent meaning) were available, then the 
analogy between liability gains and losses and asset gains and losses 
would be more obvious. The obviousness of the analogy raises the 
question why, in concept or in practice, there should be a different 
standard for realizing liability gains and losses than for realizing asset 
gains and losses. 
When a lender (think bondholder) trades a loan in the market, 
no one questions that the determination of her realized gain or loss 
should be based on the difference between her basis in the liability 
(corresponding to the price paid in the past) and the amount realized 
 
 146. Interest rates have risen, creditworthiness has declined, or some combination. 
 147. As before, this assumes that the underlying asset is capital and that the seller is 
noncorporate. See supra note 145. 
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on disposition. When a borrower trades her loan in the market as part 
of an asset-liability package, why should the rules be different?148 
In concept, the determination of the borrower’s realized gain or 
loss should be the difference between her anti-basis (corresponding to 
proceeds received in the past) and the amount she is required to pay 
another to take her place as obligor on the debt. Although this is the 
approach that produces symmetrical treatment for loans as assets and 
as liabilities to the lender and borrower, respectively, ordinarily tax 
lawyers do not conceptualize the borrower’s exchange in these terms. 
The most likely explanation I think, is the lack of a key term in the 
language of tax law: anti-basis. 
3. Should the Rule Be Changed? 
Before I move past the OID rules, I will digress briefly to explain 
why I don’t think the current law treatment of discount and premium 
loan shifts should be changed. I think anti-basis is useful because it 
makes more obvious the policy implications of the present structure 
and alternative approaches. In this context, though, the arguments in 
favor of the present-law approach are stronger than those in favor of 
reform. Administrative considerations trump conceptual tidiness. 
 
    Item Amount
1. Blackacre gross value 10
2. Seller basis 4
3. Liability value 3
4. Liability face amount 2.70
5. Cash paid by buyer 7
 
 
 148. Charlotte Crane asked a similar question in her article More on Accounting for the 
Assumption of Contingent Liabilities on the Sale of a Business. See Crane, More on 
Accounting, supra note 93, at 631. She posited a hypothetical where A is a roofing 
contractor who promises to repair any problems that arise for some interval of time after 
replacing a roof. Id. B is also a roofing contractor who sells similar services in a 
neighboring state, with the same warranty. Id. Both A and B have booked all of the 
income from the roofs sold, and neither is allowed any tax reserve for future repairs that 
might be necessary. Id. Crane asks: If A and B swap territories, including warranty 
obligations, has there been a realization event with respect to the exchanged liabilities? Id. 
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If all of these facts are known and readily observable, then the 
total consideration paid is worth $10, implying economic income of 
$6, yet only $5.70 of gain is realized under present law.149 The $0.30 
that is missing—the part not taxed—is the excess of value of the debt 
over the seller’s anti-basis. Present law does not have a term for the 
historical tax account for liabilities in the same way it does for assets, 
so the exclusion of this increment of asset gain (and corresponding 
exclusion liability loss) goes unnoticed. This theoretical objection, 
explained above, illustrates the usefulness of anti-basis. 
In real world transactions fewer facts are apparent. Items 1 and 3 
(gross value and the liability value) are not observable directly and 
cannot be deduced from the parties’ agreement. The parties’ 
agreement reveals only the net value of Blackacre. Although exact 
figures for gross asset value and liability value cannot be deduced, the 
difference between them must equal $7 (net asset value). If left 
unchecked, the seller could operate under this constraint and still vary 
the character of her income within a wide range.150 Giving taxpayers 
flexibility in contexts like this is often a mistake. Tax burdens 
ordinarily ought not to vary on account of facts that have no non-tax 
economic significance for the parties to a given transaction.151 
In some instances, when pressed to do so, policymakers have 
developed solutions to problems of this type. The best example is the 
very elaborate system of rules for allocating the price paid in a bulk 
sale of assets under §	1060,152 the so called “residual method.” If a 
farm is sold for cash, then the seller’s gain on cows, horses, tractors, 
and land depends on the value assigned to each of them; and the 
buyer’s basis (which has important implications for the timing of cost 
recovery deductions) also depends on this same allocation. The price 
paid sets the wide parameters for the allocation exercise, but the 
allocation among asset classes and assets within each class depends on 
 
 149. The result described in the text is over-determined. Blackacre’s gross value, the 
liability value, and the cash paid by the buyer are like the angles of a triangle—if you know 
any two, you can figure out the value of the third. 
 150. She could say, for instance, that Blackacre was worth $7 and that the liability was 
worthless, implying asset gain of $3 and liability gain of $2.70. Or she could say that 
Blackacre and the liability were worth $15 and $8 and that her asset gain was $11, and her 
liability loss $5.30. Either way her net income is $5.70, but the tax characterization 
changes. 
 151. Andrews, supra note 12, at 955. Valuation related penalties would check 
discretion to some extent, but even if the Service wins a few skirmishes, taxpayers will win 
the war as they always do when tax burdens are made to depend on questions of value and 
the facts are unclear. 
 152. I.R.C. §	1060. 
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fair market value.153 Just as when an asset-liability package is 
acquired, the value of the component assets, referred to collectively 
as the farm, cannot be inferred from the terms of the bargain. 
Taxpayers are required to proceed based on estimates. This system 
has proven workable. 
In the context of premium and discount liability shifts, however, 
pursuing this approach is not worthwhile. Part of the conceptual 
underpinning of the residual method of purchase price allocation is 
the likelihood of divergent interests for the seller and buyer as to the 
allocation and the requirement that they report for tax purposes, 
consistent with any agreement they reach with regard to allocation.154 
In the context of liability shifts, the parties’ interests are as likely to 
align as they are to diverge. 
One way to cabin taxpayer discretion in assigning value would be 
to estimate the value of shifted liabilities by requiring taxpayers to 
figure an imputed principal amount for the shifted debt as under 
§	1274,155 using the applicable federal rate or some other proxy for 
market interest rates. The estimate of value would be added to the 
cash consideration when fixing the seller’s amount realized and the 
buyer’s basis. The buyer would then have anti-basis in the liability 
equal to the estimated value of the debt, resulting in either OID 
deductions156 (if the debt was valued at less than face value) or bond 
issuance premium (if the debt was valued at more than face value). 
This OID (or bond issuance premium) would be allocated over the 
remaining term of the debt and would increase (or decrease) the 
amount of deductible interest allowed to the buyer. 
Though feasible, making this adjustment to present law would be 
ill advised for at least three reasons. First, the determination of 
commuted value of shifted liabilities using this approach would very 
often assign a lower estimate of value than accepting that value equals 
face amount, as under present law. When lender and borrower agree 
to the terms of the loan at the outset, they have conflicting 
commercial interests and a much better ability than the tax collector 
 
 153. For a thorough description of the residual method, see TAXATION OF INCOME 
vol. 2, supra note 26, ¶	41.6.8. 
 154. §	1060(a) (“If in connection with an applicable asset acquisition, the transferee 
and transferor agree in writing as to the allocation of any consideration, or as to the fair 
market value of any of the assets, such agreement shall be binding on both the transferee 
and transferor unless the Secretary determines that such allocation (or fair market value) 
is not appropriate.”). 
 155. §	1274. 
 156. These OID deductions would be in addition to any deduction permitted for 
qualified stated interest owed on the debt. 
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to adjust loan terms based on the particular facts. If those facts 
haven’t changed much between loan inception and when the loan is 
shifted, using a one-size-fits-all discount factor to reset the terms 
seems unlikely to improve accuracy in valuation. On the other hand, 
when the liability in question has remained outstanding during an 
interval when market interest rates or creditworthiness (or both) have 
changed meaningfully, reappraisal, even if by crude proxy, might be 
an improvement. Yet I speculate that this is likely the exception, not 
the rule. 
Second, when debts are issued in connection with the acquisition 
of property—purchase money debts—the parties have wide discretion 
to set the interest rate by contract. So long as the contracted rate falls 
between Applicable Federal Rates and “clearly excessive,” it is 
respected for tax purposes.157 Forcing results to conform to a proxy 
rate in liability shifts would create a schism between newly created 
and shifted liabilities, which could be gamed with wraparound debt.158 
Third, administration of the OID rules works by requiring the 
lender to send a Form 1099-OID to the borrower. The system is set 
up this way because in most cases the lender is well equipped to 
perform the necessary computations of accrued OID and has an 
incentive to do so in a fully transparent way that ensures 
accountability: if the lender defaults on this chore, its OID deductions 
are unavailable. In liability shifts, the lender is a bystander to the 
transaction and has no claim to OID deductions that can be used as a 
carrot to coopt the lender to act as de facto compliance officer for the 
Service. 
On the other hand, a seller who wishes to reckon her financing 
gain (or loss) separately from her asset gain (or loss) has a de facto 
election. She may settle the liability with the lender in a separate 
transaction. The existence of this de facto election means that present 
law spuriously penalizes sellers unable to disaggregate their asset and 
liability realizations for commercial reasons unrelated to tax. This 
seems unfair. It also encourages disaggregation for tax reasons even 
when it would be desirable to shift the asset and liability together, 
taxes aside. This is inefficient. 
 
 157. §	1274(b)(3); Treas. Reg. §	1.1274-3 (2012); Halperin, supra note 74, at 712–14. 
 158. See GARLOCK, supra note 132, ¶	310.03. Wraparound debt “is seller financing 
with respect to property on which there is existing debt.” Id. If the seller is debtor on the 
existing debt and creditor on the wraparound debt owed by the buyer to the seller, the 
seller’s net exposure can be reduced or eliminated without shifting the existing debt to the 
buyer. 
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To sum up, from a conceptual standpoint, present law is deficient 
in that liability gains and losses that should be recognized by the tax 
system when liabilities are shifted are (usually) mischaracterized as 
asset gains or losses. This results in some ordinary income being 
misclassified as capital gains income and creates timing differences. 
When the mischaracterization helps taxpayers, they will accept the 
benefit uncritically; when it hurts them, self-help is frequently 
available by disaggregating the liability shift from the asset sale. The 
conceptual deficiencies in present law might be difficult to correct 
practically. Reliable liability valuation is difficult to estimate 
(frequent errors should be anticipated) and the third-party reporting 
system that undergirds periodic accounting for debts with OID or 
bond premium would be difficult to deploy. 
C. Nonrecourse Debt in Excess of Value 
Nonrecourse debt in excess of the value of the collateral is a 
particular (and sometimes extreme) example of a discount liability. 
This suggests that, in concept, the issues here are the same as those 
described in the preceding part. However, the issues have been 
resolved differently in this context, at least in some respects. The 
issue, familiar to all tax lawyers, was confronted by the Supreme 
Court in Tufts.159 True, Tufts (and Crane v. Commissioner,160 too) 
dealt only with nonrecourse debt, but it is important to recognize that 
when shifted liabilities are underwater it is commercially inevitable 
that the liability in question is nonrecourse to the buyer, even if the 
seller is personally liable.161 
Suppose that a seller owned Blackacre free of debt with a tax 
basis of $4. When Blackacre was worth $10 the seller pledged 
Blackacre as collateral for a loan of $8. Over time Blackacre declined 
in value to $7, and the seller then transferred ownership of Blackacre 
to a buyer, subject to the loan of $8 (full principal still outstanding) 
for nominal consideration of, say, $0.10. The buyer took Blackacre 
subject to the debt but did not pledge her own credit. 
The seller’s treatment is well settled, though more complicated 
than need be. If the loan was nonrecourse to the seller (a point 
intentionally not specified in the preceding paragraph), Tufts holds 
 
 159. Comm’r v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 317 (1983). 
 160. Crane v. Comm’r, 331 U.S. 1, 3 (1947). 
 161. No rational buyer would commit her personal credit to an underwater asset-
liability package; it would be like burning money. The debt in Crane might have given the 
lender recourse to Mrs. Crane’s deceased husband, but the Supreme Court never said one 
way or the other. 
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that the seller’s amount realized is $8, implying the seller’s gain is $8 – 
$4 = $4. If the loan was recourse to the seller, on the other hand, then 
the seller’s amount realized is $7 (Blackacre’s value), gain is $7 – $4 = 
$3, and the seller has COD income of $8 – $7 = $1.162 
Either way the seller’s overall income is $4, but in the first 
version it is all classified as gain on sale of Blackacre, and in the 
second it is divided between gain and COD income, which has 
character implications that portend rate differences and possibly 
excludable COD income.163 Thus the argument I made above in the 
context of garden-variety discount loans applies here, too: In transfers 
involving asset-liability packages, gain or loss on the asset and liability 
aspects of the transaction should be reckoned separately; if they are 
combined, income is mischaracterized, and some taxpayers harmed 
by the mischaracterization will have a de facto option to change the 
characterization by settling the debt in a separate transaction. If 
combined accounting is defensible it must be on administrative 
grounds.164 
The buyer’s treatment under present law is unsettled. The 
leading view among commentators and the few courts to have 
considered the question is that the buyer’s tax basis in Blackacre 
should be set equal to the fair market value of Blackacre on the date 
of the transaction.165 There is a division of authority on exactly how 
this rule should be implemented. Under one approach, the buyer’s 
basis in Blackacre is $7.00, and under the other approach the buyer’s 
basis is $7.10. The question is whether basis is simply set equal to the 
fair market value of the property or, instead, whether basis should be 
increased for the additional $0.10 of consideration paid by the buyer. 
The buyer won’t have an incentive to pay significant consideration in 
addition to accepting the liability shift, so the distinction here is 
usually trivial.166 
 
 162. See Treas. Reg. §	1.1001-2(a)(2) (2011). 
 163. See I.R.C. §	108.  
 164. This is related to the argument, first made by Boris Bittker, that the taxation of 
liability settlements cannot be made to depend on the use to which the proceeds have 
been put. He argued that “[i]f the tax consequences of the borrowing are tied into the 
transaction in which the borrowed funds are used, confusion is the very best that can be 
expected.” TAXATION OF INCOME vol. 1, supra note 32, ¶ 7.1. 
 165. I am assuming here that the transaction is not a tax shelter in the pattern of Estate 
of Franklin v. Commissioner, 544 F.2d 1045 (9th Cir. 1976). If the situation is akin to Estate 
of Franklin, the buyer’s basis is likely to be zero. 
 166. GARLOCK, supra note 132, ¶ 311; supra text accompanying note 144. The more 
defensible approach is to give the buyer a basis of $7.00. The $0.10 paid by the buyer is a 
sunk cost. Hence an economically rational buyer will treat $7.00 of debt as genuine (up to 
the value of the collateral) and should be given basis credit to this extent. 
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Under present law it is uncertain when the buyer may adjust her 
basis in Blackacre subsequent to the date of the sale. Two things 
potentially reduce the extent of the undercollateralization: principal 
payments on the debt and an increase in the market value of the 
collateral. When undercollaterlization is reduced by either method, it 
implies that some fraction of the principal balance not yet factored 
into the buyer’s basis must now be respected by the buyer as a 
genuine liability. Arguably, a basis increase is therefore justified in 
these circumstances. This result depends on the conclusion that, from 
the buyer’s perspective, the transaction remains open until the 
liability encumbering the property is resolved, even though the 
transaction was closed for the seller when the property was sold to the 
buyer. 
It is also possible to view the transaction as closed for both the 
seller and the buyer. Under this view, the buyer’s basis is fixed when 
ownership is acquired. If the buyer pays down principal after the 
purchase, or if the value of the collateral increases and partially 
resolves the collateral shortfall, no adjustment to basis would be 
appropriate. If basis is fixed at the time of the sale, it is logical, though 
not supported by any authority, that payments of principal in excess 
of the principal that generated basis credit at closing would give rise 
to a deduction. If this is not correct, a business-related expense will 
simply be ignored, an alternative that is difficult or impossible to 
justify. 
Regardless of whether the transaction is treated as open or 
closed for the buyer, if the lender agrees to reduce the outstanding 
principal balance on the loan, the buyer should not have COD 
income if the reduction in principal eliminates only principal in excess 
of that for which the buyer has been given basis credit. If additional 
principal is eliminated—i.e., principal that generated tax basis—then 
COD income should result. This is the likely result under present law. 
Now consider the problem with the help of anti-basis. Under the 
leading view, the buyer would take a basis of $7 in Blackacre and 
would take anti-basis of $7 in the liability shifted in the transaction. If 
the transaction is left open (so the buyer’s basis can be adjusted 
subsequent to the transfer), payments of interest would be deductible 
and payments of principal would increase in the buyer’s hands both 
basis in Blackacre and anti-basis in the liability. At the limit, if the 
debt were paid in full, basis and anti-basis would increase to $8. On 
the other hand if the transaction is closed, then payments of interest 
would be deductible, payments of principal would offset anti-basis to 
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the extent thereof, and those payments would then be deductible. As 
usual, present law is easier to explain using anti-basis. 
Anti-basis also sheds light onto the exact scope of the issue. The 
Supreme Court and some commentators have explained that the 
problem under consideration exists when the face amount of the debt 
is greater than the fair market value of the property serving as 
collateral.167 This is not the correct specification of the problem, at 
least conceptually. The correct approach is to compare (a) the 
discounted present value of all remaining principal and interest 
payments on the debt (commuted value) with (b) the fair market 
value of the property. Unless the commuted value of the debt exceeds 
the market value of the property, the buyer will have an incentive to 
honor the debt. This is true even if the face amount of the debt 
exceeds the fair market value of the property. 
If the debt’s commuted value (for emphasis, not the debt’s face 
amount) is greater than the property’s value, then my suggestion 
would be to give the buyer a basis in the property equal to the 
property’s fair market value on the date of the transaction and to use 
this figure also as the issue price of the debt. Some market index or 
proxy rate of interest would then be selected or imposed. The debt’s 
stated redemption price at maturity (“SRPM”) would be set so that 
accrual of stated interest and OID (combined to equal the chosen 
rate) would, over the remaining term of the debt, increase adjusted 
issue price to SRPM at maturity. To the extent that the face amount 
of the debt exceeds the SRPM, as so computed, the debt would be 
treated as contingent. If the buyer ever had an incentive to pay any 
amount over the SRPM (owing to a change in collateral value or pay-
down of principal), such payment would either be capitalized into 
basis in the underlying asset or deducted, depending on whether one 
prefers an open- or closed-transaction approach to accounting for 
liability shifts. 
D. Options as Contingent Liabilities 
Suppose a short-seller (“S”) writes a call option purchased by a 
long (“L”) over 100 shares of IBM stock for a premium of $10. Does 
S’s commitment to sell IBM to L at the strike price have anti-basis? 
The answer is plainly yes. The act of writing the option gave rise to 
basis in the option premium (cash) received. The option premium is 
 
 167. See Crane v. Comm’r, 311 U.S. 1, 15 n.42 (1974); Daniel N. Shaviro, Risk and 
Accrual: The Tax Treatment of Nonrecourse Debt, 44 TAX L. REV. 401, 409 (1989) (“The 
holding in Crane does not apply if, upon the acquisition of property subject to nonrecourse 
debt, the face amount of the debt exceeds the fair market value of the property.”). 
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like the proceeds of a peculiar contingent loan, where S is the 
borrower, L is the lender, and the obligation to repay depends on the 
future price of IBM stock. Viewed this way, S must have anti-basis 
given the similarity to the paradigmatic loan example. 
This approach also maps onto the tax treatment of S under 
present law. S has income if the option expires out of the money.168 
This income is conceptually similar to COD income on a loan default, 
except here default is replaced by good fortune (an unfulfilled 
contingency that would have required payment). If the option settles 
in the money or is exercised, payment by S is required. S’s loss (or 
income) would be (a) the amount the option was in the money (the 
excess of the price of IBM over the strike price of the option on the 
date of exercise) less (b) the option premium. In other words, loss 
(income) equals (a) payment minus (b) anti-basis.169 
E. Partnership Tax 
Those versed in the intricacies of Subchapter K will have 
recognized that the anti-basis test articulated above is congruent with 
the definition of “liability” now embodied in the regulations under 
Subchapter K, which reads as follows: 
An obligation is a liability for purposes of section 752 and the 
regulations thereunder	.	.	.	, only if, when, and to the extent that 
incurring the obligation— 
(A) Creates or increases the basis of the obligor’s assets 
(including cash); 
(B) Gives rise to an immediate deduction to the obligor; or 
(C) Gives rise to an expense that is not deductible in 
computing the obligor’s taxable income and is not properly 
chargeable to capital.170 
Think back through examples used in this article. Category (A) 
deals with the bank loan.171 Category (B) deals with the inventory 
 
 168. See Rev. Rul. 78-182, 1978-1 C.B. 265, 267. This ruling comes close to mentioning 
anti-basis when it explains that “[t]he premium received for writing the call is not included 
in income at the time of receipt, but is carried in a deferred account	.	.	.	.” Id. “Deferred 
account” is a synonym for anti-basis.  
 169. See id. at 268–69. The same analysis holds for put options mutatis mutandis. The 
option writer is making a long bet on the underlying security, but the written put is a 
contingent liability with anti-basis equal to the premium received. The option writer’s loss 
equals the amount that must be paid to settle the option minus anti-basis (if the difference 
is negative, it represents income).  
 170. Treas. Reg. §	1.752-1(a)(4) (as amended by T.D. 9207, 2005-26 I.R.B. 1344). 
 171. See supra text accompanying note 41. 
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delivery example and similar cases: the shopkeeper’s obligation is not 
a liability for purposes of §	752 unless and until a deduction accrues 
and is classified as a liability only to that extent.172 Category (C) deals 
with nondeductible fines and penalties, and other similar cases where, 
in my usage, anti-basis is derived from public policy aspects of the 
definition of income, rather than fidelity to underlying economic 
concepts.173 
The identity between this definition of “liability” and the output 
of my test for anti-basis is explained by their common function. The 
Subchapter K definition of “liability” is a rule grounded in the 
aggregate theory of partnership taxation. In other words, the 
definition (and its interaction with related operational rules) is 
designed to ensure that the partners are treated in the same way vis-à-
vis the partnership’s business activities as if they had undertaken their 
share of those activities on their own. 
To illustrate why each category in the litany must be treated as a 
partnership liability, consider the following three examples. In each 
example X and Y are fifty-fifty partners in XY. Y always contributes 
$5 cash and the facts vary for X from one example to the next. 
Whenever X shifts a liability to the partnership, X remains personally 
liable, so the liability is allocated solely to X under the §	752 
regulations.174 Whenever the partnership incurs a liability in the first 
instance, X alone is guarantor so, again, the liability is allocated all to 
X, none to Y.175 
First, X borrows $5 and purchases for $10 (using the borrowings 
and $5 of savings) a $10 widget machine. X contributes the machine, 
subject to the liability, to the XY partnership. X’s outside basis in XY 
equals $10, derived from X’s $10 precontribution basis in the widget 
machine.176 If instead X and Y formed the XY partnership, each 
contributing $5 cash, and caused XY to borrow $5, for which X was 
ultimately liable, and purchased the same widget machine, X’s outside 
basis in XY would only be $5 if (contrary to present law) the 
partnership’s commitment to repay the loan were not a “liability” in 
the technical sense used in §	752.177 To ensure parity between cases of 
these types is the reason why a liability that “creates or increases the 
 
 172. See supra text accompanying note 29. 
 173. See supra Section III.D. 
 174. Treas. Reg. §	1.752-2(a) (2011). 
 175. Id. 
 176. I.R.C. §	722.  
 177. Under current law the borrowing is a liability and it is allocated to X, so X is 
treated as contributing $5 cash, increasing X’s outside basis from $5 to $10. See §	752(a). 
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basis of the obligor’s assets” (category (A)) must be included within 
the §	752 definition of liabilities. 
To put it in general terms, partnership tax accounting endeavors 
to maintain equality between the partners’ bases in their partnership 
interests and the partnership’s basis in its assets (outside-inside basis 
conformity). When the partnership makes a leveraged asset purchase 
(or simply borrows and holds cash) it is the partnership’s basis in the 
asset that the rules seek to replicate in outside basis, not the liability 
itself. Thus the definition of liability must be restricted to those 
obligations that correspond to assets with tax basis created or 
increased by the obligation. 
Next, to demonstrate the need for category (B) in the 
definition—defining “liability” to include an obligation that “gives 
rise to an immediate deduction to the obligor”—suppose that X is an 
accrual method taxpayer who contributes to the partnership $10 cash 
and an accrued but unpaid debt of $5. The debt is later paid by the 
partnership. If the debt is not a “liability” then X’s outside basis in 
her stake in XY is $10, and will remain $10 even after the debt is 
discharged by the partnership.178 X’s interest in XY is worth only $5, 
and so assigning a basis of $10 must be incorrect. If the debt is a 
“liability” then X’s outside basis in XY is $10 so long as the debt 
remains unpaid. Until the partnership pays the debt, X’s $10 outside 
basis plus Y’s $5 outside basis equal the $15 basis XY has in its cash. 
When the debt is paid, the decrease in X’s share of partnership 
liabilities forces X to step down her basis to $5,179 denying X the 
artificial tax loss she would otherwise enjoy. Thus category (B), like 
category (A), is tailored to ensure outside-inside asset basis 
conformity. 
What results in this example if the debt in question had not been 
paid or accrued (so that the debt lacked anti-basis)? It would not be 
treated as a partnership liability. On formation, X’s outside basis in 
her partnership interest would be $10. When the deduction 
attributable to the debt accrued, the deduction would be allocated to 
X, and the allocation of this deduction would trigger a reduction in 
X’s outside basis from $10 to $5, so, again, X’s and Y’s outside bases 
would sum to the partnership’s cash on hand. This illustrates that 
debts that do not “[g]ive[] rise to an immediate deduction to the 
 
 178. Id. 
 179. §§	752(b), 733(1). 
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obligor”180 need not be included because the basis adjustment on the 
deduction accrual will preserve outside-inside basis conformity. 
Finally, consider category (C): debts that are nondeductible and 
noncapital. X contributes $10 cash and an obligation to pay a $5 fine 
to XY, everything else unchanged. If the fine is a liability then when it 
is discharged by XY, X’s outside basis will drop to $5,181 so outside 
basis and cash inside the partnership will both sum to $10; if the fine is 
not a liability, then X will have an outside basis of $10 throughout 
(even after the fine is paid), which means X could then sell her stake 
in XY for its value ($5) and claim a loss corresponding to the 
nondeductible fine. This would contradict the rule that fines are not 
deductible. 
Recall the definition of anti-basis: Anti-basis is the untaxed 
benefit that a taxpayer enjoys as a concomitant of an increase in the 
liabilities (or obligations) to which the taxpayer is subject. For 
category (A) partnership liabilities, the untaxed benefit that makes 
the obligation a partnership liability is tax basis in the asset, which 
corresponds to liability. Partnership tax law attempts to ensure that 
this debt-financed (inside) asset basis is reflected in the partners’ 
outside bases. Restricting the definition of “liability” to debts that 
generate basis means that outside basis is created to this extent, but 
no more. 
For category (B) partnership liabilities, the untaxed benefit is a 
tax deduction without payment. Outside basis must be given for the 
cash or other property that backstops the partnership’s obligation to 
make payment during the interval between when the liability is 
deducted and when it is paid; then, on payment, the backstopping 
asset and associated outside basis both disappear simultaneously. 
Again, partnership tax law is not attempting to give outside basis 
credit for the “liability” in its own right, but rather compensating for 
the associated asset that exists in its reflection. The explanation for 
category (C) partnership liabilities is similar, so I relegate it to the 
margin.182 
 
 180. Treas. Reg. §	1.752-1(a)(4)(i)(B) (2011). 
 181. See I.R.C. §	705(a)(2). 
 182. A nondeductible fine or penalty (or other debt that is both nondeductible and 
noncapital) is similar to a debt that is deducted before it is paid when both are viewed 
from some time after the deduction is claimed but still prior to payment. For either type of 
debt, payment will trigger no tax consequences. Thus if X transfers $10 cash and a fine of 
$5 to XY, X’s outside basis should be $10 and then $5 before and after the fine is paid, just 
as it was $10 and then $5 before and after payment of the debt for which the deduction 
had accrued in the past. 
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Thus Subchapter K tacitly incorporates anti-basis. Unlike 
§§	108(e)(2) and 357(c)(3), both of which articulate the test for anti-
basis (“would payment of this obligation give rise to a deduction?”) as 
part of the formal rule, the §	752 regulations reticulate all of the 
instances where the answer to the test question would be no, implying 
the existence of anti-basis. The same result could be reached in any of 
these cases using either approach to defining the scope of the rule. 
CONCLUSION 
Anti-basis is the untaxed benefit enjoyed by a taxpayer when a 
liability or obligation is incurred. In the business context, the untaxed 
benefit takes the form of an increase in asset basis or a tax deduction. 
In the personal context, the untaxed benefit might take one of those 
forms, or it might also be (nondeductible) personal consumption. A 
well-functioning income tax system necessarily must keep track of the 
presence or absence of any such untaxed benefit. If the liability is 
avoided by the taxpayer, any prior untaxed benefit must be taken into 
income (or be set off against basis); or, if there was no prior untaxed 
benefit, exceptions are necessary to various rules requiring income 
recognition (or basis reduction) on discharge or shifting of liabilities. 
The Internal Revenue Code requires taxpayers to account for 
anti-basis, but it does so ad hoc. Various sections tacitly incorporate 
anti-basis—such as §§	108(e)(2), 357(c)(3), and the partnership 
definition of “liabilities” in regulation §	1.752-1(a)(4), to take just a 
few of the many examples—but each section exists on an island. A 
few prior commentators have sensed that some common underlying 
principle ties these rules together conceptually. Prior to this Article, 
however, there has been no thoroughgoing treatment of the concept. 
In the end, recognizing and assigning a label to the concept that 
ties together various rules for accounting for transactions in liabilities 
is not likely to reshape doctrine or the language of tax law, other than 
peripherally. It is useful and interesting, nevertheless, to understand 
that within the baroque conceptual structure of income taxation built 
up over the past hundred-plus years, there exists a dark star that 
explains and justifies various liability-accounting rules, and reveals 
their connection to each other and to the deep structure of our tax 
system. 
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